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Abstract 
This paper develops a comprehensive framework for the quantitative analysis of the private 
and fiscal returns to schooling and of the effect of public policies on private incentives to 
invest in education. This framework is applied to 14 member states of the European Union. 
For each of these countries, we construct estimates of the private return to an additional year 
of schooling for an individual of average attainment, taking into account the effects of 
education on wages and employment probabilities after allowing for academic failure rates, 
the direct and opportunity costs of schooling, and the impact of personal taxes, social 
security contributions and unemployment and pension benefits on net incomes. We also 
construct a set of effective tax and subsidy rates that measure the effects of different public 
policies on the private returns to education, and measures of the fiscal returns to schooling 
that capture the long-term effects of a marginal increase in attainment on public finances 
under conditions that approximate general equilibrium. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper develops a comprehensive framework for the quantitative analysis of the private 
and fiscal returns to schooling and of the effect of public policies on private incentives to 
invest in education. This framework is applied to 14 member states of the European Union. 
For each of these countries, we construct estimates of the private return to an additional year 
of schooling for an individual of average attainment, taking into account the effects of 
education on wages and employment probabilities after allowing for academic failure rates, 
the direct and opportunity costs of schooling, and the impact of personal taxes, social 
security contributions and unemployment and pension benefits on net lifetime incomes. We 
also construct a set of effective tax and subsidy rates that measure the effects of different 
public policies on the private returns to education, and measures of the fiscal returns to 
schooling that capture the long-term effects of a marginal increase in attainment on public 
finances under conditions that approximate general equilibrium.  
 
The paper builds on the extensive literature that has sought to quantify the economic 
returns to schooling and brings together several of its strands. A large number of studies 
have explored the effects of education on wages and employment using individual-level data1. 
Wage effect estimates obtained in this manner can be interpreted as approximations to the 
rate of return to schooling but only under very stringent assumptions that include the absence 
of direct educational costs and infinite working lives. Another set of papers has focused on 
the construction of more elaborate estimates of the rate of return to schooling by discounting 
the lifetime earnings profiles associated with different educational levels. While this “full 
discounting” approach is conceptually well suited for the joint analysis of wage and 
employment effects and for quantifying the impact of educational finance and tax and 
benefit policies on the returns to schooling, systematic attempts to bring all or most of 
these factors into the analysis and to isolate their respective effects seem to be rather scarce 
in the literature2. Two interesting recent papers that make considerable progress in this 
direction are Barceinas et al. (2000a) and Blöndal, Field and Girouard (2002). Both of these 
studies allow explicitly for unemployment when calculating the rate of return to education. 
In addition, Barceinas et al. take into account unemployment benefits, while Blöndal et al. 
allow for taxes and isolate the contribution of educational subsidies to private returns. Another 
paper of interest is O'Donoghue (1999), who combines wage equation estimates with a 
microsimulation model to explore the effects of taxes and social benefits on the returns to 
schooling in four EU countries. This paper and a second study by Barceinas et al. (2000b)3 
are the only ones we are aware of that investigate the fiscal implications of investment in 
education. 
 
In section 2 we derive an almost closed-form expression for the private rate of return 
to schooling. This formula can be seen as a compromise between the two approaches 
outlined above. It provides a simple and intuitive way to combine the parameters commonly 
estimated in wage and employment equation studies with data on educational expenditure 
                                                                          
1. Wage equation studies have generally adopted the specification proposed by Mincer (1974). Psacharopoulos and 
Patrinos (2002) collect the results of such studies for a large number of countries and Card (1999) surveys the relevant 
literature focusing on estimation issues. On the impact of education on unemployment, see among others Ashenfelter 
and Ham (1979), Nickell (1979) and Mincer (1991). 
2. On the other hand, many studies have introduced explicit corrections for unemployment and taxes when calculating 
rates of return by the full discounting method [see Psacharopoulos (1995)]. There are also many studies that implicitly 
allow for taxes and/or unemployment in the estimation of Mincerian rates of return by using data on net-of-tax wages or 
on total earnings rather than on gross hourly wage rates [see for instance Nickell (1979)]. 
3. We thank F. Alcalá for this reference. 
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and academic failure rates and with a broad set of tax and social benefit parameters to 
construct comprehensive measures of the return to schooling that take into account a 
number of factors that have not generally been considered jointly in the literature. This is 
of course achieved at the price of some strong simplifying assumptions about the 
evolution of wages, employment probabilities and tax and benefit rates over the 
lifecycle. Hence, our procedure can only be regarded as an approximation to the 
full discounting method, but it does have the important advantage that it is much less data 
and computation intensive, and is therefore better suited for broad cross country 
comparisons. 
 
 Section 3 shows how this approach can be used to construct quantitative 
measures of the impact of various public policies on individual incentives to invest in 
education, essentially by applying the private returns formula under different 
counterfactual assumptions. We start from a hypothetical scenario in which there is no 
government intervention and sequentially introduce 1) educational subsidies and the 
public provision of free education, 2) personal income taxes, including employee social 
security contributions, 3) unemployment insurance and housing benefits for the unemployed 
and 4) retirement benefits. The effective tax rate on schooling and the components of 
this rate induced by each of these policies are then constructed by comparing private 
returns in the different scenarios. Section 4 extends our framework to analyse the fiscal 
implications of public investment in education. The fiscal rate of return to schooling and 
the net present fiscal value of an additional year of formal education are calculated using the 
same procedure as in section 2, but considering only tax and benefit flows and introducing 
some adjustments that attempt to approximate general equilibrium conditions. 
 
  Section 5 discusses the data and parameter values used in our calculations. 
Raw measures of the effects of schooling on wages, employment probabilities and 
participation rates come from Mincerian wage equations and employment and participation 
probits estimated separately for each country with individual-level data and corrected, 
to the extent possible, for endogeneity bias. Average and marginal tax and social benefit 
rates, measures of the direct cost of education and academic failure indicators come 
mainlyfrom various OECD publications. Fiscal parameters are those applicable to a single and 
childless individual of average attainment in each country in 2000. Finally, sections 6 and 7 
present the results of the analysis for 14 member countries of the European Union (EU) and 
section 8 concludes with a summary of the main findings and a discussion of their policy 
implications. 
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2 An almost closed-form private returns formula 
Any individual enrolled in post-compulsory education faces at each point in his career a 
choice between continuing his training and withdrawing from school to enter the labour 
market on a full-time basis. While other factors are certainly at work, the option to remain in 
school is at least in part an investment decision for it involves a trade-off between current 
costs (foregone wages, tuition charges and other school-related expenses) and future 
benefits (the expected increase in earnings associated with higher qualifications). 
 
As in the case of more standard investment projects, the financial payoff to an 
additional year of schooling can be quantified by computing its internal rate of return, which is 
formally defined as the discount rate that equates the present value of the relevant streams 
of incremental pecuniary costs and benefits. In this section we will derive a formula for the 
calculation of this rate of return. The calculation will take into account the explicit costs of 
schooling born by a representative agent in each country, his opportunity cost in the form 
of foregone labour income and lost work experience, and the expected increase in future 
net-of-tax labour earnings and unemployment and pension benefits arising both from higher 
wages and from higher employment probabilities. 
 
Consider an individual who attends school for X years, successfully completes S(X) 
grades, retires at time U and is expected to live until time Z. We are interested in the effects of 
one additional year of formal schooling on his expected flows of after-tax labour income and 
net social benefits, taking into account that educational attainment affects both wages and 
the probability of employment. 
 
Wages increase over time as a result of exogenous technical progress and the 
accumulation of physical capital and experience. We will assume that the wage at time t of an 
individual with schooling X and h = t - X years of experience is given by 
 
(1)   W (t , X , h) = At f S( X)( )eνh = Aoegt f S(X )( )eν ( t − X) = Aoe(g +ν )t f S(X )( )e−νX   for t∈[X, U] 
 
where At is an efficiency index that reflects both technological progress and capital 
accumulation. The effects of schooling are captured by the function f[S(X)], where S denotes 
school attainment measured by the number of successfully completed grades, which is in 
turn an increasing function of the time spent in school, X. For simplicity, the experience 
premium on wages, eνh, is assumed to be a function of potential experience (i.e. of the time 
that has passed since the individual left school) rather than of actual years of employment and 
to grow at a constant rate (which means that it will not display the hump often found in 
empirical wage-experience profiles)4. We will approximate the wage of the “average worker” in 
the economy, Wo, by that corresponding to an individual of average attainment, Xo, at the 
mid-point of his career, that is, 
 
(2)   Wo(t ) = W (t , Xo , Ho / 2) = Aoegt f S( Xo)( )eνH o / 2  
 
where 
 
(3) Ho ≡   U - Xo, 
 
is the expected duration of the working life of an individual of average attainment. 
                                                                          
4. There is some evidence [see for instance Brunello and Comi (2004) and the references therein] that ν is also an 
increasing function of educational attainment. Since we will not take this effect into account, our calculations will tend to 
underestimate the return to schooling. 
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The probability of employment will be assumed to be an increasing (and 
time-invariant) function of schooling. We will denote by p[S(X)] the function describing this 
relation for the case of an adult worker seeking full-time employment, and by ps(S) = ηp(S) 
the analogous function for a student seeking part-time employment. Hence, η is an 
adjustment coefficient that corrects for the differential employment probability of students. 
 
We will allow for taxes and for unemployment and pension benefits. To keep 
the problem tractable, we need to assume that tax rates depend only on the agent's status 
(that is, on whether he is employed, unemployed or retired) and do not change over time as 
his income rises with technical progress and experience5. To achieve this, we will assume that 
tax rates are a function of X alone, so the net-of-tax earnings per “efficiency unit of labour” at 
age t of an adult worker with X years of training who is employed full time will be given by 
 
(4)   Fe(X ) =   e
−ν X f S ( X )[ ] − T e −ν X f S ( X )[ ]( ) 
 
where T() is the total tax due per efficiency unit of labour. If the same worker is unemployed, 
he is entitled to a benefit which will be a function of previous earnings. An unemployed 
worker's net income per efficiency unit of labour will be given by 
 
(5)   Fu (X ) =   B e
−νX f S ( X )[ ]( )− T B e −ν X f S ( X )[ ]( )⎛ ⎝ ⎜ ⎞ ⎠ ⎟  
 
where 
  
B e −νX f S ( X )[ ]( ) is the benefit per efficiency unit of labour, written as a function of 
the wage prior to the loss of employment. The expected net income at time t of an adult 
worker can then be written 
 
(6)   F( X)Aoe
(g+ν )t =  p S(X )[ ]Fe( X ) + 1 − p S(X )[ ]( )Fu (X ){ }Aoe( g +ν )t  
 
where we have multiplied F(X) by the non-education component of the wage function 
W(t, X, t-X) in order to recover total expected labour income from the functions Fe() and Fu() 
that give wages per efficiency unit of labour. 
 
We will assume that students are not entitled to unemployment benefits (which is 
true in most countries, as a minimum period of previous employment is generally required 
for contributory benefits), and that their wages, Ws, do not rise with experience. We will write 
the gross income of a student with attainment x as a fraction (1-φ) of the wages of an adult 
full-time worker of average experience with the same qualifications, 
 
(7)  W s ( t , x ) = (1 − φ )W (t , x , H o / 2) = (1 − φ ) f S( x )( )Ao e gt eν H o / 2  
 
Hence, we can think of φ  as the fraction of the work year devoted to full-time school 
attendance but it should be kept in mind that this parameter will also implicitly capture other 
factors (such as the lack of experience and the nature of the jobs available to young people 
who seek part-time or summer employment) that will influence the wages of students relative 
to those of adult workers. Under these assumptions, the expected net earnings at time t of a 
student who has completed x years of training are given by 
 
(8)   Aoe
gteνHo / 2Fs( x) =   ps S(x )[ ] (1 − φ ) f S (x)[ ]− T (1 − φ) f S (x)[ ]( ){ }A oe gt eνHo / 2  
 
where ps() = ηp() is the relevant probability of employment as discussed above. 
                                                                          
5. The first part of this assumption –that tax rates do not change over time as average incomes rise with technical 
progress and factor accumulation– may not be a bad approximation in the medium or long run. While tax brackets are 
not explicitly indexed to average wages in any country in our sample, periodic reforms may work in this direction. 
Otherwise, fiscal drag would gradually raise income tax receipts as a fraction of GDP and this does not seem to have 
been the case in EU countries over the last two decades. The second half of the assumption –that tax rates remain 
constant over an individual's life cycle– is harder to defend. To minimize the error it induces in our computations, we will 
work with tax rates that approximate those applicable to the representative worker at the mid-point of his career. 
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We will also take into account pensions, but we will do so under rather strong 
simplifying assumptions that are essentially designed to yield an upper bound on the 
impact of retirement systems on the private (and fiscal) returns to schooling. We proceed 
in this way because trying to capture the complexity of existing pension systems would 
take us too far afield and because, as we will show below, this will not have a significant 
effect on our calculations, since retirement benefits accrue far into the future and must be 
discounted accordingly. We will assume that pensions are initially set as a fixed fraction, κ, of 
gross wages at the time of retirement, U, 
 
(9)   Pu X( ) = κW (U, X ,U − X) = κAoe( g+ν )U f S(X )( )e−νX  
 
and that their real value grows over time at a constant rate, ω, so that 
 
(10)  Pt X( ) = Pu X( )eω ( t −U ) = κAoe(g +ν )U f S(X )( )e−νXeω ( t −U ) = κAoe(g +ν −ω )Ue−νX f S( X)( )eωt  
 
for t > U. Assuming as above that tax rates are a function of X but not of time, the net-of-tax 
pension at time t (> U) will be given by 
 
(11) Aoe
(g +ν −ω )UeωtFp X( )≡ κe−νX f S( X)( )− T κe−νX f S( X)( )[ ]{ }Aoe(g +ν −ω )Ueωt  
 
Finally, we will assume that the direct cost to the agent of each year of schooling is a 
constant fraction µs of the earnings of the average worker, 
 
(12)   µsWo(t ) = µsAoegt f S( Xo)( )eνH o / 2  
 
Given these assumptions, the present value of the agent's expected lifetime net 
earnings can be written 
 
(13) V(X) =
 
Aoe
νHo / 2Fs (t )
0
X∫ e−(R +ν )t dt  +  AoF(X )XU∫ e−Rt dt +  
 +
 
Aoe
(g +ν −ω )UFp X( )e−(R+ g+ν −ω )t
U
Z∫ dt  -  µs0X∫ AoeνH o / 2 f (So )e−(R+ν) tdt   
where  r  is the discount rate,  S ≡ S(Xo), and 
 
(14) R ≡ r - g - ν 
 
The first term on the right-hand side of (13) denotes the present value of expected 
labour earnings while attending school and (potentially) working part-time between times 0 
and X; the second term gives the present value of labour income and unemployment benefits 
over the individual's post-school working life (between times X and U), and the third the 
discounted value of pension benefits beween retirement and the expected time of death, Z. 
The last term corresponds to the present value of the direct costs of schooling born by the 
agent (i.e. net of public subsidies). 
 
 To calculate the rate of return to schooling, we will compute its net marginal 
product, which will be given by the derivative of the net lifetime earnings function, V'(X), and 
solve for the value of the discount rate, r, that makes this derivative equal to zero when X= Xo 
(i.e. for an individual of average attainment). Using Leibniz's rule to differentiate V(X) and 
keeping in mind that So and Ho are fixed quantities (for they refer to the average worker in the 
entire economy and not to our reference young individual), we have 
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A bit of algebra will show that 
 
(15) 
V' (X )
Aoe
−RX = e−νX eνH o / 2 Fs (X ) − µs f (So )[ ]− F(X ) + 1 − e
−RH
R
F' (X ) + γ (R)Fp' X( ){ } 
 
where 
(16) 
  
γ ( R) ≡ R
R + g + ν −ω
1 − e−(R +g +ν −ω )( Z −U )
eRH − 1  
 
is the relative discount factor that must be applied to the pension component of the benefits 
of schooling before they can be compared to its wage benefits. 
 
Setting the derivative in (15) equal to zero when X = Xo and operating, we have: 
 
(17) 
  
R
1− e−RHo =
F' (Xo ) + γ (R)Fp' Xo( )
F(Xo ) − Fs( Xo)e−νXoeνH o / 2[ ]+ µs f (So )e−νXo eνH o / 2  
 
This expression shows that the return to schooling is an increasing function of the 
ratio between the gain in expected net income induced by a marginal increase in school 
attendance and the cost of schooling. The denominator of this ratio can be written as the sum 
of an opportunity (F - Fs) and a direct cost component, and the numerator as the sum of two 
terms that capture the benefits that accrue respectively during the agent's working life and 
after retirement. Notice that, before being added to the wage component of the payoff to 
schooling, F'(), retirement benefits (Fp') are weighted by a factor γ(R) that discounts for their 
later accrual and takes into account their potentially different growth rate (ω rather than g+ν) 
and expected duration (Z - U rather than H). 
 
To rewrite equation (17) in a form that can be used directly in our calculations, we 
define the tax and benefit parameters listed in Table 1. The symbols τe, τu, τs and τp denote 
the average income tax rates faced by the representative employed and unemployed adult 
workers, student part-time workers and pensioners, T'e, T'u and T'p are the corresponding 
marginal tax rates, and b and B' are the average and marginal gross replacement rates 
for unemployed workers. Grouping some of these terms we construct T', τ  and ∆ so that 
(T' and τ  are equal to zero in the absence of taxes), p(1-T') and p(1-τ) are the expected 
marginal and average net-of-tax factors for adult workers, and ∆ captures the difference in net 
earnings between employed and unemployed adult workers. Finally θ  is the Mincerian returns 
parameter commonly estimated in microeconometric wage equation studies, and it measures 
the impact of schooling on gross wages. 
 
  
V' (X ) = AoeνH o / 2Fs (X )e−(R+ν)X − AoeνH o / 2µs f (So)e−(R +ν )X
             + Ao F' ( X)
X
U∫ e−Rtdt − F(X )e−RX⎧ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ 
⎫ ⎬ ⎪ ⎭ +Aoe
(g +ν −ω )U Fp' X( )e−(R+ g+ν −ω ) t
U
Z∫ dt⎧ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ 
⎫ ⎬ ⎪ ⎭ 
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Table 1: Tax and benefit parameters used in the rate of return formula 
______________________________________________________________________
  (18) 
  
τe ≡
T e−νXo f (So )( )
e−νXo f (So )
,  
 
τu ≡
T B e−νXo f (So )( )⎛ ⎝ ⎜ ⎞ ⎠ ⎟ 
B e−νXo f (So )( )  ,  τs ≡ T (1 − φ) f (So )( )(1− φ )f (So) ,  τp ≡
T κe−νXo f (So )( )
κe−νXo f (So )
 
  (18)  
 
T'e ≡ T' e−νXo f (So)( ),    
 
T'u ≡ T' B e−νX o f (So)( )⎛ ⎝ ⎜ ⎞ ⎠ ⎟ ,      T'p ≡ T' κe−νXo f (So)( ) 
  (19) 
  
b≡
B e−νX o f (So )( )
e−νXo f (So )
,  
  
B' ≡ B' e−νX o f (So)( ) 
  (20) 
  
1− T' ≡ 1− T'e( )+ 1 − pp 1 − T'u( )B'   ⇒  T' ≡ T'e − 1− pp 1− T'u( )B'  
  (21) 
  
(1- τ ) ≡ (1 −τ e ) + 1 − pp (1 −τu )b  ⇒   τ = τ e −
1− p
p
(1− τu )b 
  (22)   ∆ ≡ (1− τe ) − (1− τu )b 
  (23) 
  
θ ≡ f' (So )
f (So )
 
where p ≡  p(So).  
______________________________________________________________________   
It is easy to check that 
 
(24)   F( Xo) =   p(1- τ )e−νX o f (So)  
(25)   Fs (Xo ) =   ps( 1− τ s )( 1− φ) f (So )  
(26)   Fp (Xo ) =   (1 −τ p )κe
−νXo f (So )  
(27)   Fp' (Xo ) = 1− T' p( )κe−νXo f ' (So )S' (Xo ) − νf (So )[ ] 
(28)   F' (Xo )   = p 1 − T'( )e−νXo f ' (So)S' (Xo ) −νf (So )[ ]+ p' S' ( Xo )∆e−νX o f (So)  
 
where it should be understood that p(), p'() and ps() are evaluated at So = S(Xo). Notice that 
the terms of F'(Xo) and FP'(Xo)  that capture the marginal increase in wages or pensions due 
to schooling include a negative component of the form -νf(So). This is so because an extra 
year spent in school means one less year of experience, and this has a permanent effect on 
earnings that partially offsets the wage increase due to education, which is captured by the 
term f'(So)S'(Xo). 
 
Using these expressions, equation (17) becomes 
 
  
(29) R
1− e−RHo =
p 1− T'( ) θS' ( Xo) −ν[ ]+ ∆p' S' ( Xo) + γ ( R) 1− T' p( )κ θS' (Xo ) − ν[ ]
p(1- τ ) −ηp(1 − φ)( 1− τ s )eνH o / 2[ ]+ µseνH o / 2
                       ≡ θnet + p'net +PENS
OPPC + DIRC ≡ R'
 
 
Hence, [by (14)] the private rate of return to schooling is given by 
(30) rp = Rp + g + ν 
 
where g is the growth rate of average wages, ν the contribution of experience to the growth 
of individual wages over the lifecycle and Rp is the value of R that solves equation (29)6. 
                                                                          
6. The above calculations assume that unemployment benefits are set as a function of gross income in employment. 
This is so in most countries, but there are two exceptions. Germany and Austria set benefits as a fixed fraction (β) of 
net-of-tax income in employment and do not tax them. It is shown in Appendix 2 that equation (29) continues to hold in 
this case provided we redefine T', τ and ∆ as follows: 
(20') 
  
1− T' ≡ 1 + 1− p
p
β⎡ ⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 1− T'e( ) (21')   (1- τ ) ≡ 1+
1 − p
p
β⎡ ⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ ( 1− τe )   and 
(22')   ∆ ≡ (1− τe )( 1− β)  
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To interpret equation (29), notice that its left-hand side is an increasing function 
of R where the term 1-e-RHo that appears in the denominator serves to adjust for the fact that 
the “useful life” of the asset (the working life of the individual, Ho) is finite. The right-hand side, 
R', is simply the ratio of the marginal benefits derived from an additional year of 
schooling (which we can interpret as the “dividend” paid by human capital) to its cost, with 
all the terms expressed as fractions of the initial gross earnings of an adult employed 
worker with average education, Ae-νXof(So). The first term in the numerator (θnet) captures 
the expected increase in after-tax earnings and unemployment benefits holding the 
probability of employment constant and taking into account the opportunity cost of losing a 
year of experience to remain in school. The second term (p'net) measures the increase in 
expected net earnings that comes from an increase in the probability of employment holding 
wages constant, and the third one gives the discounted value of the increase in expected 
retirement benefits. Notice that, except for the experience offsets, all these terms are directly 
proportional to the marginal productivity of time spent at school, S'(Xo). The denominator 
measures the total cost of an additional year of schooling as the sum of two terms. The first 
one (OPPC) is the opportunity cost of school attendance (net foregone wages), and the 
second one (DIRC) the direct costs of schooling born by the student or his family. 
 
Public policies influence the private return to schooling in many ways. Educational 
subsidies or the direct public provision of educational services at no charge will raise the 
return to schooling by lowering its direct cost to the individual (DIRC). Pension benefits 
will also raise rp, provided of course they are linked to wages as we have assumed (which 
is not always the case in our sample). The effect of taxation is more complicated. Notice that 
a proportional income tax (i.e. a tax system in which  Te ' = Tu' = Tp' = τ e = τu = τ s ) would 
have absolutely no effect on the return to schooling whenever there are no direct costs 
(i.e. when DIRC = 0) because taxes would then reduce both the costs and the benefits of 
education in the same proportion. Hence, the effects of the tax system will come from 
differences among the tax rates that enter the formula and from their interaction with the 
direct cost term, DIRC. Under a proportional tax system, an increase in the (single) tax rate 
will reduce R' if DIRC > 0 and increase it otherwise (that is, if students receive a net subsidy) 
because higher taxes will reduce the benefits of education in a greater proportion that its 
costs in the first case, and by a smaller one in the second. 
 
When we abandon the proportionality assumption, changes in marginal and 
average tax rates have different effects. An increase in either  Te ' ,  Tu' or  Tp' reduces the 
return to schooling by lowering the net wage gains term, θnet, or the value of retirement 
benefits, PENS. An increase in student taxes,  τs , also reduces R' by increasing the 
opportunity cost of schooling, OPPC. An increase in  τu , however, raises the incentive to 
invest in education because it increases the earnings premium on being employed, p'net, 
and lowers the opportunity cost of studying. Finally, an increase in the average tax rate on 
employed workers,  τe , reduces both p'net and OPPC. The net effect will be an increase in 
the rate of return whenever R' > S'p'/p, a condition which holds in all the countries in the 
sample we will consider below. 
 
 An important special case is the one where schooling has no employment benefits 
or direct costs (that is p'= µs = 0), there are no retirement benefits (κ = 0) and students do not 
work part-time (φ = 1). In this case, the tax system affects the returns to schooling only 
through its progressivity at the average wage level: as the tax system becomes more 
progressive [i.e. as the ratio (1-Te')/(1-τe) declines], the incentive to invest in education falls. 
This is a useful benchmark because in practice it is not a bad approximation to the situation in 
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many countries, where the employment-related effects of schooling and its direct costs are 
relatively unimportant, at least after government intervention. 
 
Finally, the effects of the average and marginal gross unemployment replacement 
ratios are also different. Raising B' increases the return to schooling through θnet, while 
raising b reduces the return both by lowering p'net and by increasing OPPC. Under a flat-rate 
benefit system (with B' = b), an increase in benefits is likely to reduce the return to schooling 
for realistic parameter values7. 
                                                                          
7. The condition for this is   (1 − p)(1 − Tu ' )θ ' < ( 1− τu ) p' S' +(1 − p)R'[ ], which again holds for all the 
countries in the sample. 
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3 Effective tax rates on schooling 
To quantify the contribution of various forms of government intervention to the private return 
to schooling, it will be useful to compute the rate of return under a set of different 
counterfactual assumptions or scenarios. We will consider five such scenarios, starting from a 
hypothetical situation in which there is no government intervention and then adding various 
policies one by one. In scenario [1] (NO GOV'T) we assume that private agents pay the full 
costs of education and there are no taxes or social benefits. In scenario [2] we introduce 
subsidies to education and the public provision of schooling free of charge, maintaining the 
remaining assumptions. In [3] we introduce personal taxes, in [4] unemployment and housing 
benefits and in [5] pensions. For this last scenario, we will use a gross replacement rate 
of 67% (of wages at retirement) and assume that pension benefits grow at the same rate as 
wages (ω = g). Table 2 summarizes these hypotheses. 
 
Table 2: Assumptions underlying the scenarios 
____________________________________________________________ 
 raw return 
NO GOV'T 
educational
subsidies 
personal 
taxes 
all-in return 
OBS 
pensions 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 direct costs total private private private private 
 taxes none none observed observed observed 
 unempl. benefits none none none observed observed 
 pensions none none none none κ=0.67 and ω = g 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
Since our assumptions on pension determination are only meant to be illustrative 
and do not reflect the true features of national retirement systems, we will focus on the 
before-pension rates of return obtained under the assumptions of scenario [04] (OBS) as our 
baseline measure of the observed private returns to education. In what follows, we will refer 
to estimates of rp obtained under the assumptions of the NO GOV'T and OBS scenarios as 
raw and all-in returns respectively. 
 
The rate of return estimates obtained under the different scenarios will be used to 
construct a set of effective tax and subsidy rates that measure the impact of public policies 
on private incentives to invest in education. We calculate the tax or subsidy wedge 
(  wedgegov' t ) generated by public policies as the difference between the raw and all-in rates of 
return, and define the effective tax rate on schooling (  etrgov' t ) as the ratio between the tax 
wedge and the raw return. Letting ri denote the estimated rate of return to schooling under 
scenario i, we have 
 
(31)   wedgegov' t = rno gov't − robs     and    
 
etrgov' t =
wedgegov' t
rno gov' t
 
 
Notice that  wedgegov' t  and  etrgov' t  capture the joint effect of all the public policies 
we are considering except for pensions. To isolate the impact of each individual policy, it will 
be useful to write  wedgegov' t  and   etrgov' t  as the sum of three factors that capture the 
separate effects of educational subsidies, personal taxes and unemployment benefits as 
follows. First, we write   wedgegov' t  in the form 
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(32) 
  
wedgegov' t = rno gov't − robs = (r no gov' t − rsubsidies ) + (rsubsidies − rtaxes ) + (rtaxes − robs)
                 ≡ −wedgesubs + wedgetax + wedgeben
 
 
Dividing through by  rno gov' t , the corresponding partial tax and subsidy rates are 
given by 
 
(33) 
  
etrgov' t =
wedgegov' t
rno gov' t
= −wedgesubs + wedgetax + wedgeben
rno gov' t
          ≡ −subsedu + etrtax + etrben
 
 
Finally, we proceed in a similar way to construct the effective subsidy to schooling 
implied by retirement benefits, 
 
(34) 
  
subspens =
wedgepens
rno gov't
= rpens − robs
rno gov't
 
 
(Notice that the partial wedges and rates are defined so that their signs are positive 
under normal circumstances, that is, whenever taxes and unemployment benefits reduce the 
private return to schooling and educational subsidies and pensions increase it). 
An alternative decomposition of the tax rate on schooling 
To gain some additional insight into the factors that affect the different components 
of the effective tax rate on schooling, it will be useful to construct an alternative 
decomposition of this variable. Let us denote by R'obs the right-hand side of the rate of 
return formula given in equation (29) after excluding the pension term in the numerator, 
 
  
(35) Robs' = p 1− T'( ) θS' ( Xo) −ν[ ]+ ∆p' S' ( Xo)
p(1 - τ ) − ηp(1− φ )(1 −τ s )eνH o / 2[ ]+ µseνHo / 2
                     
 
It will be convenient to divide both the numerator and the denominator of R'obs by 
p(1-τ) so as to express all terms as fractions of the expected after-tax income of an active 
adult worker. As shown in Appendix 2, this yields an alternative expression for R'obs of the 
following form 
(36) 
  
Robs' = (1− π )θ' +(1 − ρ )ε'
1 −η (1− φ ) 1− τ s
1- τ e
νH o / 2⎡ ⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ +
µs
p(1- τ ) e
νHo / 2
= 
 
(1 − π )θ ' +( 1− ρ)ε'
OPPC' + DIRC'  
 
The parameters θ' and ε'  that appear in the numerator of this expression are defined 
as 
(37)   θ' ≡ θS' (Xo ) − ν  
and 
(38) 
  
ε' ≡ p' (So )
p(So)
S' (Xo )  
and measure the marginal contribution of schooling to expected income working respectively 
through the wage and the employment channels. The other two coefficients that enter the 
numerator of R'obs, π and ρ, can be interpreted as the tax rates on these two components of 
the return to schooling. The first one, 
 
(39) 
  
ρ ≡ (1 −τu )b
p(1- τ ) , 
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is the net replacement rate measured as a fraction of the expected net earnings of an active 
adult worker (rather than as a fraction of income in employment as this variable is commonly 
defined)8,  and the second, 
 
(40) 
  
π ≡ 1 − 1 − T'
1− τ =
T' −τ
1 −τ , 
 
is an index of the progressivity of the tax system. 
 
Using equation (36), we will now construct an approximate decomposition of 
the overall tax rate on schooling (excluding pensions). The values of R' corresponding to the 
NO GOV'T and OBS scenarios can be written in the form 
 
  
R' no gov' t = θ ' +ε'C    and     R'obs =
(1− π )θ' +(1 − ρ )ε'
(1− s)C  
 
where C = OPPC' + DIRC' in the no-government scenario and s is the overall subsidy rate on 
total schooling costs, taking into account the effect of taxes and unemployment benefits on 
the opportunity cost of education. 
 
Let us now define a new measure of the overall tax rate, t, by working directly with 
these two terms as 
 
(41)  t ≡ R' no gov' t − R'obs
R' no gov't
= 1− R'obs
R' no gov't
 
 
It should be clear that t will not coincide with the effective tax rate defined above 
(  etrgov' t ) but the intuition will carry over since r is an increasing transformation of R'. (In our 
sample, the correlation between t and  etrgov' t  is 0.983). 
 
We now observe that 
 
(42) 
  
1− t = R'obs
R' no gov' t
=
(1 − π)θ' +( 1− ρ)ε'
(1 − s )C
θ ' +ε'
C
= 1
1 − s 1 − π( )
θ'
θ ' +ε' + 1 − ρ( ) ε'θ' +ε'
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥  
 
Hence, the overall net-of-tax factor, 1-t, is the product of an increasing function of 
the subsidy rate, s, and a weighted average of the net-of-tax factors on the wage and 
employment components of the return to schooling, with weights that are proportional to the 
shares of these components in the total return. Notice that the “tax rate” on the wage 
component of the returns to schooling is our measure of progressivity, π , and that on the 
employment component is the modified net replacement rate, ρ. The first of these terms, in 
turn, can be decomposed into two parts that reflect, respectively, the progressivity of the tax 
and benefit schedules faced by employed and by unemployed workers. Letting πe and πu 
                                                                          
8. In the case of Germany and Austria, where (non-taxable) benefits are set as a fixed fraction, β, of net income in 
employment, the net replacement ratio is given by 
(39')
  
ρ ≡ β
p +(1- p)β  
and equation (36) continues to hold as written. 
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denote the partial progressivity measures for employed and unemployed workers, which are 
defined by 
(43)   
  
1− πe ≡ 1− T'e1− τe     and     
1− πu ≡ (1 − T'u )B'(1 −τu )b , 
it is easy to show that9 
 
(44)   π = πe + ( 1− p)ρ πu − πe( ) 
 
Hence, unemployment benefit parameters will affect π as well as ρ and their 
introduction may raise the overall tax rate, t, through an increase in average progressivity, 
especially in those countries where unemployment rates, approximated by 1-p, are high. This 
effect will be particularly strong when unemployment compensation is paid at a fixed rate or 
benefit ceilings are binding, since that makes the marginal tax rate on additional schooling 
equal to 100% for the unemployed. 
 
                                                                          
9. See Appendix 2. 
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4 The fiscal return to schooling 
By raising wages and employment probabilities, public expenditure on education increases 
future tax revenues and pension liabilities and is likely to reduce expenditure on 
unemployment benefits. Proceeding as in section 2, we can treat such expenditure as an 
investment that generates a stream of net public revenues over the agent's lifecycle and 
compute a fiscal rate of return to schooling that will summarize the long-term impact of 
educational spending on government finances. This variable, which we will denote by rf, will 
be defined as the discount rate that equates the present value of public schooling expenditure 
(which includes an opportunity cost component as school attendance reduces wage income 
and hence current tax payments) with the present value of the induced incremental flows of 
tax revenues and savings on social protection payments. This fiscal rate of return can also be 
interpreted as the maximum real rate of interest at which the government can borrow to 
finance educational expenditure without increasing the present value of current and future 
deficits. In addition, we will also compute the net present fiscal value of an additional year of 
schooling, defined as the difference in present value terms between incremental net fiscal 
revenues and public educational expenditures. 
 
We will consider the net tax revenue streams associated with adult and student 
workers and with pensioners. In addition to the personal taxes considered in the previous 
section, we will now take into account social security contributions by employers and 
consumption taxes. The tax revenue per efficiency unit of labour generated by an adult 
worker of schooling X is given by the difference between the benefits that accrue to him and 
the direct and indirect taxes paid by him directly or by his employer on his behalf, that is, by 
  
 
  
Ge(X ) ≡ T e−νX f S(X )[ ]( )+ τ cC e−νX f S(X )[ ]− T e−νX f S( X)[ ]( )⎡ ⎣ ⎢ ⎤ ⎦ ⎥ + E e−νX f S( X )[ ]( ) 
 
when employed and by 
  
Gu ( X) ≡ −B e−νX f S(X )[ ]( )+ T B e−νX f S( X )[ ]( )⎡ ⎣ ⎢ ⎤ ⎦ ⎥ + τ cC B e−νX f S(X )[ ]( )− T B e−νX f S(X )[ ]( )⎡ ⎣ ⎢ ⎤ ⎦ ⎥ ⎡ ⎣ ⎢ ⎤ ⎦ ⎥ 
 
when unemployed. In these expressions, the function T() captures personal taxes on 
workers, including employee social security contributions, as a function of their gross 
income, E() denotes social contributions paid by employers, C() gives consumption as a 
function of after-tax income, and τc is the tax rate on consumption. Notice that T(), E() and 
C() all give amounts per efficiency unit of labour. 
 
 Since the wages of adult workers grow at a rate g+ν, the expected net tax revenue 
generated by an adult agent at time t will be given by 
 
         Aoe
(g +ν )t G(X ) ≡ q S(X )[ ] p S(X )[ ]Ge(X ) + 1 − p S(X )[ ]( )Gu (X ){ }Aoe(g +ν ) t  
 
where q() gives the probability that the agent will be active as a function of his attainment 
level and p() the probability that he is employed, conditional on his being active. Notice 
that the participation rate is relevant for our calculations here because only those students 
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that become active pay taxes or are entitled to unemployment benefits or (in most countries) 
to pensions. 
 
 Similarly, the expected net tax revenue generated at time t by a student with 
schooling X is given by 
 
   
 Aoe
gteνH o / 2Gs (X ) ≡ qs S(X )[ ]ps S(X )[ ]AoegteνH o / 2
             * T ( 1− φ) f S(X )( )( )+ E ( 1− φ) f S(X )( )( )+ τ cC (1 − φ) f S(X )( ) − T (1− φ ) f S( X)( )( )[ ]{ }
 
where qs() = ηqq() gives the probability of participation of a student of attainment S(X), that is, 
the probability that he will be seeking a part-time job while attending school. Finally, the total 
net tax revenue generated by a pensioner of schooling X will be given by 
 
  
(44) Aoe
( g+ν −ω )UeωtGp X( )≡ Aoe( g+ν −ω )Ueωt *
                             −κe−νX f S(X )( ) + T κe−νX f S(X )( )[ ]+ τ cC κe−νX f S(X )( ) − T κe−νX f S(X )( )( )⎡ ⎣ ⎢ ⎤ ⎦ ⎥ ⎧ ⎨ ⎩ ⎫ ⎬ ⎭ 
 
The present value of the expected stream of tax revenues (net of unemployment 
and pension benefits and public expenditure on education) associated with a worker of 
achievement S(X) can be written 
(45)Vg(X) = 
  
Aoe
νHo / 2Gs (t )
0
X∫ e−(R+ν )tdt  +  AoG( X)XU∫ e−Rt dt   
–
  
µg
0
X∫ AoeνHo / 2 f (So)e−(R +ν )t dt  
+
  
q S( X)[ ]Gp (X )Aoe(g +ν −ω )U
U
Z∫ e−(R+ g+ν −ω ) tdt  
 
where R ≡ r – g - ν , r  is the discount rate, and  µgAte
νHo / 2 f (So )  is annual government 
expenditure per student. Notice that the pension term, Gp(), enters the equation multiplied 
by q(), since we assume that only active workers are entitled to (contributory) retirement 
benefits. 
 
Differentiating Vg (), and setting the result equal to zero when X= Xo it is easily shown 
that the fiscal rate of return on schooling is given by 
(46) rf = Rf + g + ν 
 
where  Rf  is the value of  R that solves the following equation 
 
(47) 
  
R
1− e−RHo =
G' (Xo ) + γ ( R) q' S' ( Xo)Gp( Xo) + qGp' (Xo )[ ]
G( Xo) − Gs (Xo )e−νXo eνH o / 2[ ]+ µg f (So )e−νX oeνHo / 2  
 
and γ(R) has been defined above in 
 
(16) 
  
γ ( R) ≡ R
R + g + ν −ω
1 − e−(R +g +ν −ω )( Z −U )
eRHo − 1
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Proceeding as in section 2, we will rewrite equation (47) in terms of a more 
convenient set of parameters. (The detailed calculations are in Appendix 2.b). The 
relevant coefficients are defined in Table 3 and include the average and marginal propensities 
to consume out of after-tax income of students, pensioners and adult employed and 
unemployed workers (ci and C'i with I =  s, p, e, u), and the average and marginal rates of 
employers' social security contributions for employed adult and student workers (ee, es 
and E'e) and a set of marginal (∆'i) and average (Ti) total tax rates for the different types of 
agents that capture the combined effect of the different types of taxes and of unemployment 
and retirement benefits10. 
 
Looking at equation (53), for instance, Te, is the fraction of the gross income of an 
employed adult worker that is paid in taxes either by himself or by his employer. This 
variable is the sum of the average rates of personal income tax and employer contributions 
to social security plus the result of applying the consumption tax rate to the fraction of 
after-tax income that is consumed. The term Ta measures the expected net tax revenue 
generated by an active adult worker, that is, the difference between taxes paid when 
employed (Te) and net benefits received when unemployed (-Tu), both weighted by their 
respective probabilities. Similarly, ∆'a captures the expected increase in net tax revenues per 
active worker that is generated by a marginal increase in his attainment level, S. Both of these 
expressions can be either positive or negative depending on employment probabilities and tax 
and benefit levels. The total tax rates on unemployed workers and pensioners (Tu and Tp), on 
the other hand, are always negative, since government subsidies are assumed to be their only 
source of income. 
 
Using this notation, equation (47) becomes 
(56)
  
R
1− e−RHo = Rf ' ≡
Ta
q'
q
S' +∆' a θ' + Te − Tu( )p' S'⎡ ⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ + γ (R) Tp
q'
q
S' +∆' p θ'
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
Ta − ηqpsTs (1 − φ)eνH o / 2[ ]+ µgq eνH o / 2 ≡
N 1 + γ ( R)N 2
D
 
                                                                          
10. In the case of Germany and Austria, the average and marginal total tax rates for unemployed workers will be given 
by 
  Tu ≡ −(1 −τ ccu )( 1− τe )β     and      ∆' u ≡ − 1 −τ cCu '( )1− Te'( )β  
Table 3: Parameters used in the fiscal returns formula 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 (48)  
  
cs ≡ C ( 1− τs )(1 − φ) f (So )[ ](1 −τ s )( 1− φ ) f (So)     ce ≡
C (1 −τe )e−νX o f (So )[ ]
( 1− τe )e−νXo f (So )
   
 
cu ≡
C ( 1− τu )be−νXo f (So )[ ]
(1 −τu )be−νXo f (So )
 
 (49)  
  
C'e ≡ C' ( 1− τe )e−νXo f (So )[ ]     C'u ≡ C' (1 −τu )be−νXo f (So )[ ]    C'p ≡ C' ( 1− τ p )κe−νXo f (So )[ ], 
  (50) 
  
es ≡ E ( 1− φ) f (So )[ ](1 − φ) f (So )      ee ≡
E e−νXo f (So )[ ]
e−νX o f (So )
   and   
 
E'e ≡ E' e−νXo f (So)( ). 
  (51)   Ts ≡ τ s + τ ccs (1 −τ s ) + es    
  (52)   Tp ≡ −(1− τ p )( 1− τccp )κ    ∆' p ≡ −(1− τcC'p )(1 − Tp' )κ  
  (53)   Te ≡ τ e + τ cce(1 −τ e ) + ee    ∆' e ≡ T'e + 1− T'e( )τ cC'e +E'e  
  (54)   Tu ≡ −(1 −τ ccu )( 1− τu )b    ∆' u ≡ − 1- τ cC'u( )1− T'u( )B'  
  (55)   Ta = pTe + 1 − p( )Tu     ∆' a ≡ p∆' e + 1− p( )∆'u        
______________________________________________________________________ 
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where q(), q'() and p'() are all evaluated at So, ηq = qs/q and θ' = θS'-ν. The remaining 
variables have the same meaning as in section 2 (although some adjustments will have to be 
made in their values to approximate general equilibrium effects, as will be discussed below). It 
is also easy to show that the net present fiscal value of a year of schooling, calculated as of 
time Xo (i.e. when the representative individual leaves school), can be approximated by 
 
(57) NPFV(ro) =    Vg' (Xo )e
roXo =  
  
= N 1 1− e
−(ro −g −ν )Ho
ro − g − ν +N 2e
−(ro −g −ν )Ho 1 − e
−(ro −ω )( Z −U )
ro −ω − D
⎧ 
⎨ ⎪ 
⎩ ⎪ 
⎫ 
⎬ ⎪ 
⎭ ⎪ 
qe−νH o / 2Wo  
where ro is the discount rate, Wo the average gross salary of a full-time worker with average 
schooling and N1, N2 and D have been defined in (56). 
 
Equation (56) has essentially the same interpretation as the private returns formula 
given in section 2. That is, rf  is an increasing function of the growth rate of wages over the 
lifecycle and of the ratio of the marginal (fiscal) benefits of an additional year of schooling to its 
(budgetary) costs, adjusted for the finiteness of working lives. We have written Rf' so that all 
its cost and benefit components are measured as fractions of an adult worker's gross wages. 
 
The numerator of Rf' in equation (56) measures the expected net annual contribution 
to the public budget of an additional year of schooling. Its first term captures the impact of 
an increase in the labour force participation rate. Since inactive workers pay no taxes on 
labour income and are not entitled to unemployment benefits, increasing the labour force 
participation rate will increase net tax revenues provided tax payments by newly active 
workers exceed the social benefits paid to them. The second term, ∆a'θ', captures the net 
revenue effects of higher salaries, which increase tax payments by employed workers but also 
the insurance entitlements of the unemployed. The third term, (Te-Tu)p'S', reflects the impact 
of the increase in the probability of employment and is unambiguously positive since greater 
employment implies both higher tax revenues and lower unemployment payments (recall that 
Tu is always negative). Finally, the pension-related terms that appear in the numerator are 
weighted by the same discount factor as in the private returns calculation and are both 
negative, as pension liabilities will increase both with the rate of labour force participation and 
with wages. 
 
The denominator of Rf' is the sum of the opportunity and direct budget costs of 
schooling. The opportunity cost term is the difference between expected net tax receipts 
from a full-time worker and net receipts from a part-time student worker. The direct cost 
component, finally, is equal to government expenditure per student divided by the labour 
force participation rate. This correction is required because expenditure is incurred for all 
students, but only those that enter the labour force pay taxes on labour income or are entitled 
to unemployment benefits. 
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5 Data and parameter values 
This section gathers together the data required to calculate the private and fiscal returns to 
post-compulsory schooling in the member countries of the European Union with the 
exception of Luxembourg, for which some of the required data are not available. These rates 
of return will be calculated by applying the formulas derived in the previous sections to 
a representative individual for each country endowed with average school attainment. We 
will assume that this representative agent's income, when employed, is equal to the gross 
earnings of the average production worker (APW) as estimated by the OECD11. When 
computing the private rate of return, it will also be assumed that the agentis active throughout 
his working life –that is, that he is active while attending school at post– compulsory levels 
and remains a member of the labour force until the average retirement age. Hence, the 
employment probabilities and related parameters used in this calculation are conditional on 
labour force participation. For the estimation of the fiscal returns, we will also take into 
account the probability of participation in the labour force of the representative individual. 
 
To calculate the taxes on labour income to which the individual of reference would 
be subject in each country (including national and regional income taxes and social security 
contributions) and the unemployment and housing benefits for which he would be eligible, we 
have assumed that i) he is single and has no children (so as to abstract from cross-country 
differences in family support policies), and ii) that any unemployment spells he suffers are 
relatively short-lived and do not exhaust contributive benefits. As noted above, we will not try 
to construct realistic estimates of the pension benefits that would accrue to our representative 
individual in each country. Instead, we will make uniform and rather generous assumptions 
about pension determination in order to obtain an upper bound on the effects of retirement 
systems on private and fiscal returns. 
Our estimates of private returns will be obtained under partial equilibrium 
assumptions, that is, taking as given the aggregate level of schooling and factor prices. 
To calculate fiscal returns, on the other hand, we will try to approximate general equilibrium 
conditions. This will require adjustments that will reduce the values of some of the key 
parameters (in particular, θ, p'and q'), as will be discussed in section 7 below. 
                                                                          
11. This assumption is made for convenience, as it allows us to make use of the estimates of APW earnings and of the 
relevant tax rates that are provided by the OECD for all countries in the sample. It should be noted, however, that this is 
not necessarily a good approximation, for average wages and skill levels in manufacturing may differ from those in the 
overall economy. 
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Tables 4 and 5 define the variables and parameters used in the computation of the 
private and fiscal rates of return to schooling and gives their sources. We have set the growth 
rate of average wages in the economy (g) to 1%. This is the observed average annual 
growth rate of real compensation per employee in the EU15 between 1981 and 2000. The 
experience component of the growth rate of individual wages over the lifecycle (ν) has 
been set at 1.38% per annum. This figure has been obtained as the constant growth rate 
that better approximates the quadratic experience-earnings profile estimated for a typical EU 
country12. We have also assumed that student earnings from part-time work are 20% of the 
wages of an adult worker of average attainment and experience, and that pensions are initially 
set at 67% of gross wages at the time of retirement and are indexed either to prices (ω = 0) or 
to wages (ω  = g). Finally, we assign what we consider conservative values to the average and 
marginal propensities to consume of different types of workers (ci and C'i with I = e, u, s, p for 
employed and unemployed adult workers, students and pensioners, respectively). 
 
Our estimates of the direct costs of schooling (µ, µs and µg) are based on data on 
expenditure on secondary and higher education taken from recent issues of the OECD's 
Education at a Glance. These variables try to approximate the (total, private and public) cost 
per student of a marginal increase in enrollments, which would have to come at the upper 
secondary and university levels since attendance at lower levels is already compulsory in 
the EU. Public expenditure (µg) includes the operating costs of public educational institutions 
(net of research expenditure by universities), subsidies to private centers and two types of 
subsidies to households: tuition-related grants and cash subsidies that help defray living 
expenses and other costs. The private (household) expenditure indicator (µs) captures the net 
costs paid by families and is shown net of government transfers (which makes them negative 
in quite a few European countries). Hence, we do not take into account expenditure on 
books, school materials, lodging or transportation. Total expenditure (µ) is calculated as the 
                                                                          
12. We estimate ν by fitting a linear trend to the wage-experience profile predicted by a set of Mincerian regressions. 
Since HWW do not report the coefficients of potential experience and its square we proceed as follows. First, 
we estimate a Mincerian wage regression with 1996 ECHP data for those countries for which hourly wages can be 
recovered. We use the estimated coefficients of potential experience and its square to construct the time profile of the 
experience premium (in log terms) and regress it on a linear trend for each country. The slope coefficient of this 
regression provides a preliminary estimate of ν for each country. We calculate the ratio of this quantity to the estimate 
of θ  from the same regression (which is different from the one used in our calculations), and average these ratios across 
countries, obtaining a value of 0.1927. We then multiply this value by the average value of θ  in our sample (after 
correcting it for the likely net bias). This gives a value of 1.38%, which is our final estimate for ν. 
Table 4: Parameter values used in the calculation of the private  
and fiscal return on schooling  
______________________________________________________________________
g = 1%, growth rate of average real wages. Source: AMECO Database, European Commission, 
DG for Economic and  Financial Affairs. 
ν = 1.38%, percentage increase in real wages with each year of experience. See footnote no. 12. 
1−φ = 0.2, part-time student earnings as a fraction of APW wages. 
κ = 0.67, gross pension replacement rate (= initial pension before tax/ gross wage at retirement).
ω = 0 or g, rate at which a worker's pension grows over time in real terms. 
ce = C' e = 0.8, average and marginal propensities to consume out of after-tax income for 
employed  adult workers. 
cs = 1, average propensity to consume of employed  students. 
cu = C' u = cp = C' p = 0.9, average and marginal propensities to consume of unemployed  adult
workers and pensioners. 
______________________________________________________________________
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sum of public and private expenditure (plus expenditure by enterprises on apprenticeship 
programmes in the case of Germany)13 and is shown net of non-tuition grants, which we 
consider a transfer of income to the private sector rather than a real resource cost of 
education. We also calculate total expenditure inclusive of non-tuition grants. This variable will 
be denoted by µg'  because we will use it in our calculation of fiscal returns as an estimate of 
the budgetary cost per student of an increase in attainment financed entirely by the 
government, holding constant the observed level of non-tuition subsidies. 
 
All our indicators of the direct costs of schooling are weighted averages of 
expenditure per student at the secondary and tertiary levels and are measured as a fraction of 
the gross earnings of the average production worker (Wo). We use weights of 2/3 and 1/3 for 
secondary and tertiary schooling respectively to try to capture the impact of a marginal 
change in upper secondary attainment under the assumption that half of the new graduates 
will go on to university. 
 
Table 5: Variables used in the calculation of the private  
rate of return on schooling and sources of the data 
µs and µg = private and government expenditure per student and year, 
measured as a fraction of APW gross earnings. Source: Education at a Glance. 
See section 1 of Appendix 1. 
µ and µg' = total expenditure per student and year, net and gross of government 
grants for non-tuition purposes, measured as a fraction of APW gross 
earnings. Source: Education at a Glance. See section 1 of Appendix 1. 
Wo = gross wage of the average production worker (APW) in 2000. Measured in 
US dollars, using current exchange rates. Source: OECD (2001). 
θ = Mincerian returns to schooling parameter. Source: constructed using 
estimates for 1995 taken from Harmon, Walker and Westergaard-Nielsen 
(2001) and other authors. 
p, p' = probability of employment after leaving school, conditional on 
participation in the labour force, and derivative of p with respect to school 
attainment. Source: estimated using individual data from ECHP. 
ps =  probability of employment while attending school, conditional on 
participation in the labour force. We estimate it as ps = ηp, where η is defined 
below. 
η  = correction factor capturing the greater difficulty of finding part-time 
employment while attending school. Source: calculated as the ratio between 
the probability of employment of  those enrolled in education and those not 
enrolled in education among active workers aged 20 to 24, using data for 
1998 from Education at a Glance 2000. See section 3 of Appendix 1. 
q, qs, q' and ηq = probability of labour force participation of adult workers and 
students, derivative of the first variable with respect to school attainment and 
adjustment factor for students. Constructed using the same sources and 
procedure as p, ps, p' and η. 
 
                                                                          
13. Educational expenditure by enterprises only appears to be significant in Germany, where the bulk of non-public 
spending on secondary education corresponds to contibutions by business firms to apprenticeship programmes. 
(We thank L. Wössman for pointing this out). 
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Table 5: Variables used in the calculation of the private  
rate of return on schooling and sources of the data 
τe and Te' = average and marginal tax rates on labour income (including national 
and regional income taxes and employee social security contributions) 
applicable in 2000 to a single employed worker earning APW wages. Source: 
OECD Tax database. 
τs = average tax rate on student earnings from part-time work, estimated as the 
tax rate on labour income applicable in 2000 to a single worker earning 20% 
of the APW salary. Source: estimated using OECD (2001). 
τu and Tu' = average and marginal tax rates on unemployment and housing 
benefits applicable to a single worker earning APW wages prior to the loss of 
employment. Source: estimated using OECD (2000).  
τp and Tp'  = average and marginal tax rates on pensioners, estimated as the 
personal tax rates (excluding employee social security contributions) 
applicable to a single worker earning 67% of APW wages. Source: OECD Tax 
database 
τc = Consumption tax rate. Source: Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000). 
ee and E'e = average and marginal rates of employer social security contributions 
(expressed as a fraction of gross wages rather than total labour costs) 
applicable to a single employed worker earning APW wages. Source: OECD 
Tax database. 
es = average rate of employer social security contributions for part-time student 
work. Estimated  using the OECD Tax database. 
b and B' = average and marginal gross replacement ratio. The average gross 
replacement ratio is defined as the ratio of gross unemployment and housing 
benefits to gross income in employment. Source: OECD (2000). 
β = net replacement ratio (ratio of unemployment benefits to net after-tax 
earnings while employed). This is calculated for countries where benefits are 
linked to after-tax earnings in employment (and are not taxed). Source: 
OECD (2000). 
S'(Xo) = expected increase in schooling (measured in completed grades) per 
additional year spent in school. Estimated using OECD data on school 
survival probabilities as discussed in section 4 of Appendix 1. 
So = average years of school attainment of the adult (over 25) population in 1990. 
Source: de la Fuente and Doménech (2001). 
Xo = years required to complete average attainment. See section 4 of Appendix 1. 
U  = Average retirement age in 1995. Source: Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999). 
H = U - Max(6+Xo, 14) = estimated length of the (post-school) working life of 
the representative individual. 
Z = Life expectancy at birth in 2000. Source: Eurostat. Calculated as a weighted 
average of male and female life expectancies with weights given by each sex's 
share in total employment.   
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MINCERIAN RETURNS 
A key input to our calculations is the Mincerian returns to schooling parameter (θ) that 
measures the percentage increase in gross wages (wages before income taxes and 
employee social security contributions) resulting from an additional year of schooling. Seeking 
a balance between the reliability of individual estimates and cross-country comparability, we 
have constructed a set of estimates for this parameter using the results of microeconometric 
wage regressions reported in Harmon, Walker and Westergaard-Nielsen [HWW (2001)], de 
la Fuente, Doménech and Jimeno (2003), de la Croix and Vandenberghe (2003) and 
Ciccone (2004)14. 
 
The first of these sources is the introduction to a collective volume summarizing 
the results of a large research project on the returns to education in Europe known as 
PURE (Public funding and private returns to education) that was recently sponsored by 
the European Commission. In this paper, HWW use relatively homogeneous data on hourly 
wages provided by the project's national teams to estimate the Mincerian returns 
parameter (θ) using a common econometric specification. For each country, they estimate 
separate wage equations for men and women controlling for potential experience (i.e. time 
since the completion of education) and the square of this variable. For the eight countries 
in our EU sample for which HWW provide estimates based on data on gross wages, our 
estimate of θ is obtained by averaging their male and female estimates, weighting them by the 
share of each sex in total employment (using data from the 2000 Labour Force Survey 
provided by Eurostat). 
 
The remaining countries are Belgium, for which HWW provide no results, and a set 
of five countries (Austria, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) for which the data used 
by HWW refer to net rather than gross wages (i.e. to wages after personal income taxes and 
employee social security contributions have been witheld). For Spain, Belgium and Italy, our 
estimates of θ are taken from a set of recent studies of the economic returns to education 
also sponsored by the European Commission [de la Fuente, Doménech and Jimeno (2003), 
de la Croix and Vandenberghe (2003) and Ciccone (2004)]. The first two of these studies use 
data on gross wages and a specification that is identical to the one in HWW except in that a 
single equation is estimated for men and women jointly, including a sex dummy variable to 
allow for differences in wage levels. Using the same specification, Ciccone (2004) works with 
data on net wages but then adjusts his results to approximate gross returns using previous 
estimates of gross and net returns in Italy to construct a correction factor. 
 
For the remaining countries, we have constructed estimates of the gross (before-tax) 
return to schooling as follows. In the case of the Netherlands, we have found in the chapter 
for this country of the PURE volume [Smits et al. (2001)] an estimate of male and female 
returns to schooling based on gross wages in 1996 that is obtained with a specification 
almost identical to the one used by HWW (p. 183, Table 10.3)15. Since similar estimates could 
not be found in the country chapters for Austria and Greece, we have adjusted HWW's 
results using the theoretical relationship between net and gross returns. The procedure is 
as follows. In the notation of section 2, the gross return to schooling is given by θ = f'(S)/f(S) 
                                                                          
14. One alternative we have explored is to estimate the Mincerian parameter using data from the European Community 
Household Panel Survey (ECHP). However, this source has some serious disadvantages relative to the national data sets 
used in the studies cited above that in our view more than outweight the potential advantages of using a common data 
source. In particular, the breakdown of the population by educational attainment is generally much coarser than in 
national sources, sample sizes are considerably smaller in many cases, and hourly wages cannot be recovered for all 
countries. 
15. The only difference is that, unlike HWW, Smits et al include a dummy for part-time workers in the female equation, 
but its estimated coefficient is zero. 
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and the net return by θn = Fe'(S)/Fe(S) where Fe(S) = f(S) - T[f(S)]. Working with this last 
expression, it is easy to show that 
  
θn = Fe' (So )Fe(So ) =
( 1− Te' )f ' (Se )
(1 −τ e )f (Se ) =
( 1− Te' )
(1 −τ e ) θ  
where Te' and τe are the marginal and average income tax rates applicable to an employed 
worker. We have used this formula to estimate the gross return to schooling given HWW's 
estimate of the net return. The data on marginal and average tax rates required for 
the calculation are taken from the OECD Tax Database and come originally from Taxing 
Wages [OECD (2001)]. They refer to the year 2000 and are those applicable to a single 
person with no children and APW gross earnings. This calculation yields adjustment ratios 
of 0.873 for Greece and of 0.792 for Austria. 
 
All the estimates of θ  we have used are obtained by OLS (or WLS) and are therefore 
potentially subject to conflicting biases arising from measurement error and from the omission 
of ability in the regression. The consensus view in the literature seems to be that the net 
effect is likely to be a small upward bias. On the basis of a review of the results of twin 
studies, Card (1999) argues that the net bias in OLS estimates of the returns to schooling is 
likely to be around 10%. We have used this figure to correct the estimates discussed above. 
The values of θ  shown in Table 7 below already incorporate this correction. They have been 
obtained by multiplying the original estimates by 0.9. 
EMPLOYMENT AND PARTICIPATION EFFECTS 
Following Heckmann (1979), we use a two-stage procedure to estimate the effect of 
schooling on labour force participation rates and employment probabilities. First we estimate 
a probit model that relates the probability that a given individual will be active (q) to his or her 
level of education, measured by years of schooling, and a series of personal characteristics 
and other variables that are listed in Table 6. Then, we estimate a second probit relating the 
probability of employment (p) to schooling and to a subset of the same explanatory variables, 
including as an additional regressor a variable that measures the propensity of the individual 
to participate in the labour market16. This variable, known as the inverse Mill's ratio, is 
constructed using the results of the first-stage regression. Its inclusion in the second equation 
serves to correct the likely sample selection bias that would arise in its absence. 
 
 
The data are taken from the 1996 wave of the European Community Household 
Panel survey (ECHP), except in the case of Sweden, where the data correspond to 1997. 
The years of schooling variable used in the participation and employment probits is 
                                                                          
16. In order to avoid identification problems, the explanatory variables used in the second equation should be a subset 
of the set of regressors of the first-stage equation [see Wooldridge (2002)]. In our case, we assume that marital status 
and the number of children under twelve years of age affect the participation decision but not the probability of 
employment conditional on participation. 
Table 6: Non-schooling variables used in the participation and employment equations 
____________________________________________ 
  participation employment 
 sex (male) X X 
 potential experience X X 
 potential experience squared  X X 
 married  (*) X  
 married *male X  
 child ren below twelve X  
 child ren below twelve* male X  
____________________________________________ 
(*) In addition to those that declare this status, we count as married  those persons that are living in a 
"consensual union" with another person (question PD007). 
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constructed by combining information from two different questions in the ECHP survey 
with the theoretical durations of the different school cycles reported in de la Fuente and 
Doménech (2002; Table 4). The first question classifies respondents into three educational 
levels (low, medium and high, with high corresponding to tertiary studies and medium to 
upper secondary). The second question gives the age at which the individual left the highest 
schooling cycle he completed. This last question can in principle be used to construct a direct 
estimate of years of schooling, but the percentage of responses is low in four countries. An 
additional problem is that an estimate of years of schooling based on this question will be 
biased upward if the agent had to repeat a course or temporarily interrupted his studies at 
some point. Hence, we base our attainment estimates on the response to the first question. 
On the other hand, we use the second question to try to refine the initial breakdown into three 
educational levels by distinguishing between primary and lower secondary education on the 
one hand, and between the first and second cycles of university on the other. For instance, a 
person who classifies himself as having a low education will be assumed to have completed 
lower secondary schooling except if the number of years of schooling implied by the answer 
to the second question is lower than the theoretical cumulative duration of this cycle, in which 
case we assume the individual has only completed primary schooling. 
 
The detailed results of the estimation are in Tables A.9 and A.10 in section 5 of 
Appendix 1. The probabilities of employment (p) and of labour force participation (q) of adult 
workers are estimated as the prediction of the relevant equation for the average values 
of the regressors. Our preliminary estimates of p' and q' are the estimated marginal effects of 
the schooling variable, calculated at the sample means of all the regressors. Since 
these estimates potentially suffer from the same biases as the Mincerian coefficients 
discussed above, our final estimates of p' and q' are obtained by multiplying the preliminary 
estimates by 0.9 and 0.8 respectively. This correction is entirely ad-hoc since we lack an 
outside estimate of the size of the relevant net bias, but it seems plausible that the bias on p' 
will be of the same order of magnitude as that in wage equations, and that the bias on q' may 
be larger as agents who know early on that it is unlikely that they will be seeking a job in the 
future for reasons that we cannot control for will choose to leave school early. 
 
We have been unable to use the ECHP data to estimate the employment and 
participation probabilities of students17. To get around this problem, we have used aggregate 
data from the 2003 edition of Education at a Glance to calculate rough correction factors for 
the employment and participation probabilities of students (ηp and ηq). This source reports 
the employment and participation rates of the 20 to 24 age group in 2001, distinguishing 
between those enrolled in educational institutions and those who have already completed 
their formal schooling. A preliminary estimate of the correction factors is obtained by dividing 
the first of these figures by the second one. To obtain the values of ηp and ηq shown in 
Table 7 below, we  assign a value of 1 to countries where the preliminary estimate exceeds 
that value (that is, we assume that, other things equal, it is never easier to find part-time 
employment as a student than a full-time job). See section 2 of Appendix 1 for further details. 
 
 
 
                                                                          
17. The survey includes two questions that may in principle be used to identify students, but neither of them suits our 
purposes. The first one asks whether the individual is or has been enrolled in formal schooling during the current or 
preceding year, and the second one asks the person to identify his or her main activity, giving “student” as an option. 
The problem with the first question is that, because it mixes currently enrolled students with those who have recently 
completed their training, its use as a control variable will underestimate the effects of school enrollment on the variables 
of interest. For the second question, the problem is the opposite one, as it is likely that many employed students will fail 
to report education as their main occupation. In some countries, for instance, the intersection between self-reported 
students and the labour force or the employed population is empty. 
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TAX RATES AND UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
Tax and benefit parameters are taken from various OECD sources and refer to single 
individuals with no children. All the personal tax rates used to calculate private returns 
incorporate (local and national) income taxes and, when appropriate, employee (but not 
employer) social security contributions so as to be consistent with the definition of gross 
wages that seems to have been used in the wage equation estimates we are using. For the 
calculation of fiscal returns, employer social insurance contributions and consumption taxes 
are taken into account as well. 
 
The average and marginal tax rates on adult employed workers and pensioners 
(τe, Te', τp and Tp') and employer social security contribution rates for full-time workers 
(ee and Ee') are taken directly from the OECD's on-line Tax Database (and originally from 
Taxing Wages) and refer to the year 2000. The tax rates on employed adult workers are 
those applicable to an individual earning the same salary as the average production 
worker (APW), i.e. with average earnings for full-time workers in the manufacturing sector, 
while those for pensioners correspond to 67% of APW wages18 and do not include social 
security contributions, from which we assume pensioners are exempt. Employer social 
contribution rates on part-time student earnings (es) have been approximated, for lack of 
better information, by those applicable to workers earning 67% of APW wages. For most 
countries this is actually correct, as contributions are levied at a flat rate on gross wages, but 
in a handful of them this is not the case. 
 
The average tax rate on student income (τs) has been constructed using 
the description of the 2000 tax systems of European countries given in Taxing 
Wages 2000-2001. This rate has been calculated under the assumption that the gross 
income of an employed student is 20% of before-tax APW earnings. The consumption tax 
rate (τc) is taken from Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000). These authors construct τc as the ratio 
between consumption tax revenue (including excise and general consumption taxes) and total 
final consumption measured in gross terms (i.e. including indirect taxes) using data for the 
period 1991-97 taken from the OECD's National Acccounts and Revenue Statistics. 
 
All benefit parameters (B', b and β) and the average and marginal tax rates on 
unemployed workers (τu and Tu') have been calculated using the information contained in the 
country chapters of the OECD's Benefit Systems and Work Incentives 1999 [OECD 2000)] 
assuming again that we are dealing with a single individual with no children whose wage prior 
to the loss of employment was equal to APW earnings19. We have used this source rather 
than OECD (2001) because it contains a more detailed description of the tax treatment of 
unemployment benefits. For this calculation, we have assumed that any unemployment spells 
experienced by the representative worker are sufficiently brief that he does not exhaust the 
contributive benefits to which he is entitled. Replacement rates have been constructed taking 
into account benefit ceilings (the marginal rate, B', is set to zero when the ceiling is binding for 
our reference individual) and incorporate housing benefits for the unemployed but treating 
them as lump-sum payments. While this is incorrect in many cases, the description of these 
benefits provided by OECD (2000) is too sketchy to allow a more careful treatment, and the 
resulting error is unlikely to be important because housing benefits are generally a small 
fraction of income out of employment. The one exception to this is the UK, but the amount of 
                                                                          
18. Notice that this is not exactly in accordance with our assumption about replacement rates. We have assumed that 
initial pensions are set at 67% of wages at the time of retirement, which will be higher than those of the average worker. 
Hence the tax rates we use will be initially too low, but the situation may be gradually reversed over time if pensions grow 
less than average wages, as seems to be the case in most countries. 
19. While the tax parameters for employed workers and students correspond to 2000, the tax and benefit parameters 
for unemployed workers will reflect the regulations in force one year earlier. This is unlikely to be an important problem, 
as legislative changes between the two years appear to be infrequent and minor. 
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the benefit appears to be fixed in this case. (See section 2 of Appendix 1 for additional details 
on the calculation of tax and benefit parameters). 
ACADEMIC FAILURE RATES, SCHOOL DURATIONS AND LENGTH OF WORKING LIVES 
As noted above, we distinguish between school attainment measured by the number of 
succesfully completed grades, S, and the number of years spent in formal schooling,  X. 
These two quantities can differ because students may take several years to complete a single 
grade or may drop out of the system without passing a grade. To construct the function S(X) 
that relates these two variables, we would need comparable data on repetition and drop 
out rates for the countries in the sample. Since we have not been able to find such 
information, we have constructed a rough approximation to S(X) using OECD data on survival 
rates in tertiary studies and on other indicators that can be used to approximate the school 
survival rate at the upper secondary level. 
 
In particular, we approximate the marginal contribution of time in school to 
academic progress, S'(Xo), by an estimate of the yearly probability of survival in school (σ). 
This probability is estimated separately for upper secondary (σusec) and tertiary studies 
(σuniv) using the procedure discussed in section 4 of Appendix 1. The results are then 
averaged across levels in the usual way, so that the single value of S'(Xo) that is used in the 
rate of return calculations is given by S'(Xo) = (2*σusec+σuniv)/3. 
 
The estimates of σ are also used to correct upward the theoretical duration of these 
two school cycles so as to approximate the actual time spent in school by the average 
individual in each country. The corrected duration of each cycle will be given by Di = di/σi, 
where di is its theoretical duration in years and 1/σi the average time required to complete 
each grade. The time spent in school by an individual of average attainment, Xo, is then 
computed in the usual way but using the corrected rather than the theoretical durations of the 
upper secondary and tertiary school cycles (ignoring therefore any potential delays carried 
over from compulsory schooling). The calculation makes use of the breakdown of the adult 
population by attainment level given in de la Fuente and Doménech (2001) and refers to 1990. 
 
The expected length of the working life of the representative individual (Ho) is 
calculated as the difference between the estimated average age of retirement and the age at 
which average attainment has been completed (provided this last figure is at least fourteen 
years). Retirement ages refer to 1995 and are calculated by averaging the estimates for males 
and females reported by Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999), weighting them by the share of each 
sex in total employment (using Eurostat data for 2000 referring to the age group 25-64). 
Average life expectancy (Z) is calculated in a similar way using separate estimates for males 
and females taken from Economic Policy Committee (2001) and ultimately from Eurostat. 
 
Table 7 shows the actual data used in the rate of return calculations. Blank 
entries indicate that either the variable is not defined for a given country or is irrelevant 
for the calculations. For instance, β is defined only for Germany and Austria because 
these are the only two countries that link unemployment benefits to after-tax income in 
employment, and the marginal tax rate on unemployed workers, Tu', is not given for those 
countries where unemployment compensation is paid at a fixed rate or benefit ceilings are 
binding for the average worker (so that B' = 0 in any event) because the term that enters the 
rate of return calculations involves the product of these two variables. 
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Bold type is used in Table 7 to identify particularly unreliable data. Bold entries in 
the table indicate that an observation is suspicious or that the data required for its 
calculation are unavailable and have been “estimated” by imputing to problem countries 
the values observed in close neighbours or in countries with similar income levels. Plain 
bold characters are used when data problems can be expected to have an important 
effect on the rate of return calculations, and bold italics are used otherwise. Missing 
information about educational expenditure or its financing has been a problem in four 
countries (Austria, Greece, Italy and Portugal) but this should not have a material impact on 
the estimated rates of return, except possibly in the case of Portugal where expenditure may 
appear to be artificially high when measured as a fraction of APW earnings due to the suspect 
and atypically low value of this variable relative to GDP per capita (see section 1c of 
Appendix 1). Our estimates of S'(Xo) in Greece and the UK are also based on incomplete 
data, as no information on survival rates is available for the UK at the university level and for 
Greece in the upper secondary cycle. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 36 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0509 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: D ata used in the calculation of the private and fiscal returns to schooling 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 µ µs  µg µg'  Wo θ  p'  p 
Austria 35.33% -1.40% 36.73% 37.70% 21,364 7.74% 0.34% 95.66% 
Belgium  21.46% 0.32% 21.14% 22.99% 26,721 6.30% 1.50% 92.82% 
Denmark 21.38% -4.44% 25.82% 26.21% 34,975 5.14% 0.48% 94.86% 
Finland 22.91% -1.84% 24.74% 25.13% 29,587 7.83% 1.56% 88.16% 
France 32.76% 1.94% 30.82% 33.42% 19,171 6.99% 1.58% 92.67% 
Germany 21.29% 0.00% 18.26% 22.49% 29,423 7.85% 0.60% 94.13% 
Greece 21.56% 0.98% 20.58% 21.92% 9,734 7.39% 1.20% 88.59% 
Ireland 27.20% 0.73% 26.48% 30.07% 20,392 9.81% 2.14% 91.74% 
Italy 25.28% 0.74% 24.54% 26.15% 18,951 6.19% 1.88% 85.81% 
Netherlands 21.40% -1.34% 22.74% 23.68% 26,062 6.03% 0.53% 96.14% 
Portugal 39.51% -0.33% 39.84% 40.14% 7,041 8.73% 0.38% 95.79% 
Spain 25.64% 4.05% 21.59% 26.12% 13,816 7.54% 2.21% 80.05% 
Sweden 29.84% -5.80% 35.64% 37.61% 25,118 3.56% 1.40% 89.89% 
UK 20.34% 0.94% 19.40% 22.31% 27,864 9.30% 0.70% 94.62% 
average EU14 26.14% -0.39% 26.31% 28.28% 22,159 7.17% 1.18% 91.50% 
 
 ps q'  q η ηq τs τe Te'   
Austria 93.47% 1.13% 75.43% 0.977 0.222 18.20% 0.279 0.429 
Belgium  92.82% 2.21% 79.89% 1.000 0.183 13.07% 0.419 0.555 
Denmark 92.80% 0.86% 86.82% 0.978 0.757 20.04% 0.441 0.507 
Finland 86.62% 1.28% 84.13% 0.983 0.566 23.20% 0.336 0.480 
France 92.67% 2.18% 79.25% 1.000 0.257 18.01% 0.268 0.335 
Germany 94.13% 1.29% 82.42% 1.000 0.628 20.50% 0.420 0.579 
Greece 78.58% 1.16% 69.50% 0.887 0.122 15.90% 0.181 0.285 
Ireland 90.04% 2.94% 73.79% 0.982 0.228 0.00% 0.203 0.525 
Italy 73.02% 1.77% 71.87% 0.851 0.167 9.19% 0.285 0.404 
Netherlands 95.05% 1.53% 81.18% 0.989 0.695 10.52% 0.362 0.531 
Portugal 95.79% 1.12% 74.84% 1.000 0.218 11.00% 0.177 0.260 
Spain 72.15% 2.05% 69.26% 0.901 0.250 6.35% 0.185 0.288 
Sweden 84.79% 0.77% 91.37% 0.943 0.358 24.21% 0.329 0.352 
UK 94.62% 0.54% 82.81% 1.000 0.636 0.00% 0.236 0.320 
average EU14 88.33% 1.49% 78.75% 0.964 0.378 13.73% 0.294 0.418 
______________________________________________________________________ 
   Notes: 
- The values of θ, p'  and  q'  shown in the table are the original OLS estimates multiplied  by an ad justment coefficient (0.9 
in the first two cases and  0.8 in the third  one) that attempts to correct for the likely net endogeneity bias. 
 - Entries in bold  type ind icate unreliable estimates. For the sake of completeness, we generally estimate missing data by 
assuming that a country is similar to its neighbours.  
- When the value of η  given in Table A.6 of Appendix 1 exceeds 1, we use a value of 1. 
- We estimate educational expenditure by enterprises in Germany to be 3.03% of APW wages. 
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Table 7: Data used in the calculations -- continued 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 τu T' u τp T' p ee E' e   es  τc 
Austria   3.50% 18.90% 23.50% 23.50% 23.50% 20.0% 
Belgium  0.00%  21.10% 41.00% 32.70% 34.70% 31.70% 18.7% 
Denmark 33.84%  27.80% 41.70% 0.50% 0.00% 0.70% 25.7% 
Finland 20.89% 34.63% 20.60% 35.20% 26.00% 26.00% 26.00% 22.7% 
France 11.15% 40.56% 8.90% 32.60% 41.20% 41.20% 29.10% 18.0% 
Germany   15.00% 31.50% 20.50% 20.50% 20.50% 15.8% 
Greece 4.22% 15.90% 0.00% 0.00% 28.00% 28.00% 28.00% 18.6% 
Ireland 0.00%  11.10% 22.00% 12.00% 12.00% 8.50% 22.8% 
Italy 0.67% 19.00% 14.80% 24.00% 34.10% 34.10% 34.10% 16.0% 
Netherlands 27.55% 37.05% 4.90% 8.60% 16.20% 12.30% 15.90% 18.7% 
Portugal 0.00% 0.00% 2.90% 14.00% 23.75% 23.75% 23.75% 20.5% 
Spain 10.68%  6.00% 20.10% 30.60% 30.60% 30.60% 13.7% 
Sweden 31.97%  23.60% 31.30% 32.90% 32.90% 32.90% 18.7% 
UK 0.00%  12.60% 22.00% 9.30% 12.20% 7.80% 16.9% 
average EU14   12.34% 24.49% 23.66% 23.70% 22.36% 19.06% 
 
 β B'  b S'  Xo U H Z 
Austria 60%   91.14% 11.52 57.68 40.17 77.71 
Belgium   0.0% 37.47% 91.59% 10.24 56.12 39.89 77.87 
Denmark  0.0% 52.89% 96.70% 11.81 61.17 43.36 77.24 
Finland  58.9% 54.41% 96.07% 11.05 58.95 41.90 77.32 
France  57.4% 57.40% 93.23% 10.61 58.79 42.18 78.40 
Germany 60%   95.77% 13.06 59.59 40.53 77.35 
Greece  40.0% 40.00% 94.18% 7.98 61.55 47.55 77.82 
Ireland  0.0% 23.59% 93.47% 9.51 62.07 46.56 76.18 
Italy  30.0% 30.00% 93.57% 8.11 59.36 45.25 77.87 
Netherlands  70.0% 73.05% 96.26% 11.02 57.33 40.31 77.76 
Portugal  65.0% 65.00% 87.10% 6.50 62.32 48.32 75.29 
Spain  0.0% 68.19% 92.89% 7.17 60.50 46.50 77.50 
Sweden  0.0% 68.35% 87.83% 10.92 62.72 45.80 79.56 
UK  0.0% 35.03% 93.28% 10.66 61.36 44.70 77.34 
average EU14    93.08% 10.01 59.97 43.79 77.52 
______________________________________________________________________ 
      - Note: blank entries indicate that a parameter is not defined or not relevant for the calculations. 
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6 Results for the EU: i) Private returns and effective tax rates 
Figure 1 displays our estimates of the rate of return to schooling in the member countries of 
the EU before and after taking into account the effects of public policies (i.e. what we have 
called the raw and all-in rates of return)20. For most countries, the all-in rate of return, robs, 
lies between 7.5% and 10%, with a value of 8.78% for a hypothetical average EU country. 
Sweden is a clear outlier. The rate of return estimated for this country (4.28%) is almost three 
points lower than that of the Netherlands, which is the second country at the bottom of the 
distribution. By contrast, the estimated value of robs exceeds 10% in the UK, Ireland and 
Portugal. Raw returns vary between 3.21% in Sweden and 10.98% in Ireland. The low returns 
in Sweden are due to an atypically low Mincerian return to schooling parameter that reflects 
the country's compressed wage structure. 
 
As the reader will recall, the all-in rates of return shown in Figure 1 do not take 
into account retirement benefits. Bringing them into the calculations, under our admittedly 
unrealistic assumptions that κ = 0.67 and ω = g, will add between 0.07 and 0.70 percentage 
points to the all-in rate of return. For the average EU country, this figure is 0.24 
percentage points, and the corresponding implicit subsidy rate is 3.1%. In most cases, 
our estimates (given in Table A.13 in the Appendix) will overestimate the contribution of 
retirement benefits to private returns because pension determination and actualization 
rules are generally less generous than we have assumed. This will be particularly so in 
countries such as Ireland and the UK where pensions are paid at fixed rates or have an 
important fixed rate component. Hence, the contribution of pension benefits to the private 
return to schooling is not significant and can be safely ignored in what follows. 
 
 
                                                                          
20. In this figure, and elsewhere in the paper unless otherwise noted, the rates of return for the average EU country are 
obtained by entering the average values of the relevant parameters into the rate of return formula, and not by averaging 
the rates of return across countries. We use, in particular, the average values of T', ∆ and τ, which are computed in a 
slightly different manner in Austria and Germany but enter the final formula in the same way. 
Figure 1: Private rate of return to schooling in the EU 
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raw all-in
 
- Legend: UK = United  Kingdom; Ir = Ireland ; Po = Portugal; Fi = Finland; Gr = Greece; Ge = Germany; avge.
= average; It = Italy; Ost = Austria; Dk = Denmark; Sp = Spain; Be = Belgium; Nl = Netherlands; Sw = 
Sweden. 
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Both the raw and the all-in returns to schooling are primarily determined by the 
wage-related benefits of education and by its opportunity cost, with employment-related 
effects and direct costs playing a secondary, but far from negligible, role. As shown in 
Figure 2, almost 20% of the raw benefits of schooling in the average EU country come from 
its impact on employment rates, and over one third of its costs are direct resource costs. 
When we consider government intervention, however, the picture changes significantly: 
the share of employment effects on the total benefits of schooling drops by almost one 
half, indicating that this component of returns is taxed more heavily than the wage 
component, and direct (private) costs become negative as a result of government subsidies 
in excess of household expenditure on schooling21. There is considerable variation across 
countries in these respects, however. Subsidies are particularly generous in the Scandinavian 
countries, while net private costs are highest in Spain, mainly as a result of the existence of a 
large private sector at the secondary level which is only partially subsidized by the state. 
Employment effects account for over 30% of the raw benefits of schooling in Spain, Italy and 
Sweden and for less than 5% in Germany, Portugal, Austria and the UK. (See tables A.11 
and A.12 in section 5 of Appendix 1 for the values of the different benefit and cost 
components of the raw and all-in rates of return). 
 
Figures 3a and 3b plot our estimates of raw and all-in returns against the 
Mincerian returns parameter (θ ) that is often interpreted as a direct estimate of the returns to 
schooling. As may be suggested by the preceding discussion, the correlation between θ and 
both rnogov't and robs is high (0.87 and 0.90, respectively), but for many countries there are 
significant differences between θ and the different estimates of the rate of return that reflect, 
among other factors, the size of employment effects and the impact of taxes, subsidies and 
other public policies on all-in returns. In Denmark, for instance, the all-in return to schooling 
exceeds the value of θ  by 56% 
 
                                                                          
21. This may be somewhat misleading as our cost estimates do not take into account the purchase of books and other 
classroom materials or other school-related expenses such as transport. 
Figure 2: Relative weight of different cost and benefit components of the return to schooling
in the average EU country 
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Figure 3: Rate of return to schooling vs. Mincerian returns parameter 
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THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC POLICIES 
A comparison between the raw and all-in rates of return displayed in Figure 1 suggests that 
government policies have an often large and rather uneven impact on educational returns. 
As shown in Figure 4, the effective tax rate on human capital ranges between -57.3% in 
Denmark and 15.9% in Spain. 
 
Figure 4: Effective tax rate on human capital (  etrgov' t ) 
 
The detailed results of the wedge and tax rate calculations are shown in Tables A.14 
and A.15 in section 5 of the Appendix and are summarized in Figures 4 and 5. Table 8 shows 
the numerical values of the effective tax rates that underlie Figure 4 and a number of the 
variables that enter the approximate decomposition of this variable given in equation (42) 
in section 3. In addition to the tax rates on the wage and employment benefits of 
education (π  and  ρ), the overall subsidy rate (s) and the share of employment 
effects [ε'/(ε'+θ')], the table shows the fraction of the total direct costs of schooling that is 
paid by the government (µg/µ), the component of the progressivity indicator that 
reflects the operation of the tax system per se, abstracting from unemployment benefits (πe), 
and the increase in progressivity induced by after-tax unemployment benefits (π−πe). The 
lower panel of the table gives the normalized values of the different variables. The efective tax 
rate is measured in derviations from the sample average (notice that this is not estimated 
tax rate for the hypothetical average EU country) and the rest of the variables are normalized 
by their respective sample means, which are set equal to 100. The help identify atypical 
behaviour, we show in bold type those entries that are more than a standard deviation away 
from the sample mean. 
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Figure 5: Components of the effective tax rate on human capital 
 
a. Educational subsidies (  subs ) 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Sw Po Ost Dk Fr avge Fi Ir It Nl Be Sp Ge Gr UK  
 
b. Taxes (  etrtax ) 
-25%
-15%
-5%
5%
15%
25%
35%
Ir Ost Ge Fi Nl Gr Po avge Sp Fr It Be UK
Sw
Dk  
c. Unemployment benefits (  etrben ) 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Sw Sp Be Fr Fi Dk It avge Nl Gr Ir Ge UK Po Ost
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 43 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0509 
Table 8: Effective tax rate on schooling  and its main determinants 
______________________________________________________________________ 
   etrgov' t  
  
ε'
θ' +ε'  
ρ  π s πe π−πe 
  
µg
µ  
Spain 15.89% 0.313 0.787 0.264 0.303 0.126 0.137 0.842 
Ireland -0.54% 0.219 0.314 0.419 0.400 0.404 0.015 0.973 
Belgium  -3.85% 0.253 0.662 0.270 0.393 0.234 0.036 0.985 
Finland -8.64% 0.217 0.676 0.208 0.371 0.217 -0.009 1.080 
Germany -9.68% 0.091 0.614 0.274 0.371 0.274 0.000 1.000 
Greece -10.80% 0.187 0.498 0.127 0.286 0.127 0.000 0.955 
Netherlands -13.74% 0.107 0.835 0.262 0.402 0.265 -0.003 1.063 
Italy -15.58% 0.317 0.454 0.168 0.368 0.166 0.001 0.971 
France -19.04% 0.237 0.713 0.104 0.376 0.092 0.013 0.941 
UK -23.23% 0.086 0.472 0.133 0.343 0.110 0.023 0.954 
Sweden -33.49% 0.440 0.715 0.104 0.497 0.034 0.070 1.194 
Austria -36.99% 0.054 0.611 0.208 0.439 0.208 0.000 1.040 
Portugal -49.97% 0.052 0.797 0.097 0.458 0.101 -0.003 1.008 
Denmark -57.27% 0.120 0.638 0.147 0.495 0.118 0.029 1.208 
mean -19.07% 0.192 0.628 0.199 0.393 0.177 0.022 1.015 
 
   etrgov' t  
  
ε'
θ' +ε'  
ρ  π s πe π−πe 
  
µg
µ  
Spain 34.96% 162.7 125.4 132.5 77.1 71.4 622.8 82.9 
Ireland 18.53% 113.7 50.1 210.9 101.8 228.4 70.3 95.9 
Belgium  15.22% 131.4 105.4 136.0 100.0 132.3 165.3 97.0 
Finland 10.42% 112.8 107.8 104.5 94.4 122.6 -40.5 106.4 
Germany 9.39% 47.3 97.9 137.8 94.4 155.0 0.0 98.5 
Greece 8.27% 97.2 79.3 63.7 72.8 71.8 -1.3 94.0 
Netherlands 5.32% 55.6 133.0 131.6 102.3 149.7 -14.3 104.7 
Italy 3.49% 164.8 72.4 84.3 93.7 94.1 5.3 95.6 
France 0.03% 123.1 113.5 52.3 95.7 51.7 56.8 92.7 
UK -4.16% 45.0 75.3 66.6 87.4 62.2 102.7 94.0 
Sweden -14.43% 228.7 113.9 52.3 126.4 19.4 317.0 117.6 
Austria -17.93% 28.3 97.3 104.6 111.8 117.6 0.0 102.4 
Portugal -30.90% 27.3 127.0 49.0 116.5 57.0 -15.3 99.3 
Denmark -38.21% 62.2 101.7 73.9 125.8 66.7 131.4 119.0 
mean 0.00% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
std. dev. 19.02% 57.4 22.7 44.4 15.4 52.6 171.9 9.3 
______________________________________________________________________ 
- Note: In the upper part of the table, mean is the unweighted  average of each column.  
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Taken together, public policies (excluding pensions) imply a net subsidy to human capital at a 
rate of 16.15% in the average European country. (Notice in Figure 4 that the average value 
of   etrgov' t  is negative). Hence, educational subsidies more than offset the disincentive effects 
generated by personal taxes and unemployment benefits. The average subsidy rate (subs) 
stands at a very respectable 46% when we consider only the effects of public educational 
finance (Figure 5a) but both personal taxes and social benefits reduce the net return to 
schooling and partially offset direct subsidies to education. The effective tax rates induced by 
these factors in the average EU country are 8.2% and 21.9% respectively (Figures 5b and 5c). 
Somewhat surprisingly, unemployment protection seems to be a significantly more important 
source of distortions than taxes per se. 
 
There are very important differences across countries in terms of both the total 
effective tax burden on human capital and the sources of this burden. Spain is the only 
country where the overall effective tax rate on schooling is significantly positive. It is followed 
by Ireland and Belgium, where the net subsidy is below 4%. At the other end of the scale, the 
effective subsidy rate on schooling exceeds 30% in Sweden, Austria, Portugal and Denmark. 
 
Figure 5 and Table 8 help us understand the sources of differences in effective tax 
rates across countries. In the case of Ireland, the main disincentive has to do with the very 
high progressivity of personal taxes at APW income levels (πe). In Spain and Belgium, the 
main problem has to do with unemployment protection. In these countries employment 
effects account for a large share of the total returns to schooling and are subject to high taxes 
(i.e. to large replacement ratios). In addition, benefit ceilings are binding in both countries 
at APW income levels making the marginal tax rate on the wage benefits of schooling equal 
to 100% for the unemployed. This, in turn, raises average progressivity (π − πe is positive and 
large) and therefore the tax rate on the wage component of the returns to schooling. 
The interaction of high replacement rates, a high probability of unemployment and ceilings on 
unemployment benefits is particularly relevant in the Spanish case, where the effective tax 
rate on education is positive. When this tax rate is recomputed using for Spain the average 
values of the relevant parameters (the unemployment rate and the average and marginal 
replacement ratios), its value is of -0.47%, which brings this country much closer to the EU 
average. 
 
The four countries at the bottom of Table 8 are characterized by very large subsidy 
rates (although this result is somewhat suspect in the case of Portugal for reasons already 
discussed). In addition, the disincentive effects of personal taxes are low (except in Austria). 
In both Denmark and Sweden, the tax system actually raises the return to schooling. 
This surprising result arises from a combination of factors that includes low tax progressivity 
ratios at average income levels and the interaction between a negative private cost (µs < 0) 
and a high average tax rate on adult workers. In Portugal and Austria, finally, the tax rate 
implied by unemployment benefits is very low because the probability of employment is rather 
insensitive to school  attainment and the contribution of the tax-benefit schedule facing the 
unemployed to overall progressivity is either zero or negative. 
 
Table 9: Correlation between the effective tax rate or its components and various 
determinants 
______________________________________________________________ 
  
 
ε'
θ' +ε'  
ρ  π s πe π−πe 
 
µg
µ  
   etrgov' t  0.384 -0.154 0.615 -0.767 0.446 0.340 -0.681 
   subs  0.313 0.312 -0.399 0.779 -0.433 0.131 0.638 
   etrtax  -0.339 -0.290 0.594 -0.452 0.710 -0.359 -0.576 
   etrben  0.844 0.326 -0.195 0.282 -0.455 0.664 0.325 
______________________________________________________________ 
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To help isolate the key factors underlying the effective tax rate on schooling and 
its components, Table 9 shows the correlation between each of these indicators and 
the variables given in Table 8. These correlations suggest that the unemployment benefits 
component of the tax rate (etrben) is dominated by two factors: the weight of employment 
effects on the total benefits of schooling  [ε'/(ε'+θ')], and the contribution of social 
benefits to overall progressivity (π−πe). The tax component (etrtax) is mainly determined by the 
degree of pure tax progressivity (πe) and the subsidy rate (subs) reflects government's 
contribution to the direct costs of schooling. The overall subsidy rate and the overall degree 
of progressivity are the main determinants of the total effective tax rate, etrgov't. 
HOW DOES THE PRIVATE RETURN ON SCHOOLING COMPARE WITH THAT ON ALTERNATIVE ASSETS? 
Table 10 compares the private after-tax return to education (under the all-in scenario, OBS) to 
the before-tax real return on debt and equity. The real returns on bonds and stocks are 
averages for the period 1950-1989 and are taken from Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2002)22. 
Since these authors provide no data for Austria, Greece, Finland and Portugal, we have 
imputed to these countries the average returns in the remainder of the sample. As usual, 
the corresponding entries are shown in bold type in Table 10. Column [5] of this table shows 
what we will call the (private) premium on human capital. This variable is defined as the 
difference between the all-in rate of return on schooling (column [1] of the same table) and the 
average return on a portfolio where bonds and shares have the same weight (column [4]). 
 
 
These data suggest that schooling is a rather attractive investment from an individual 
point of view23. For the average country, the real return to schooling exceeds the return on 
                                                                          
22. The same source provides average returns for the period 1950-2000. This last year, however, is probably not a good 
reference point, for it marks the peak of a long bull market associated with a “technological bubble”. At the time the first 
version of this paper was written, many Western stock market indices had lost around 50% of their value relative to 
their 2000 peaks. The average return on the equal weights portfolio we use as a reference was one percentage point 
higher over 1950-2000 than over 1950-89 (5.02% rather than 4.03%). This is a significant difference, but it does not 
qualitatively change our conclusions. 
23. In order to draw unequivocal conclusions about the relative attractiveness of education as an investment, we would 
need to control for the riskiness of its returns. While the variation of earnings across workers with similar attainment 
levels is very high, much of this variation is not the result of random luck but of differences in individual abilities and 
career choices. We are not aware of any refined measures of earnings risk that can be used to make valid comparisons 
with other assets. 
For an attempt in this line, see Palacios-Huerta (2003). This author, however, considers only the time-series component 
of wage risk for highly aggregated sex-race-experience groups. With these data, Sharpe ratios (which measure the 
Table 10: After-tax rate of return on schooling vs. before-tax real return  
on financial assets, and premium on human capital 
__________________________________________________________ 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
  schooling 
robs 
equity bonds avge. 
portfolio 
premium on 
h. capital 
 Austria 8.52% 6.93% 1.12% 4.03% 4.49% 
 Belgium  7.47% 6.50% 1.90% 4.20% 3.27% 
 Denmark 7.99% 6.20% 2.60% 4.40% 3.59% 
 Finland 9.98% 6.93% 1.12% 4.03% 5.95% 
 France 8.63% 7.70% 3.70% 5.70% 2.93% 
 Germany 9.13% 9.50% 3.40% 6.45% 2.68% 
 Greece 9.18% 6.93% 1.12% 4.03% 5.15% 
 Ireland 11.03% 6.90% 0.30% 3.60% 7.43% 
 Italy 8.44% 4.90% 0.20% 2.55% 5.89% 
 Netherlands 6.95% 7.50% -0.30% 3.60% 3.35% 
 Portugal 10.30% 6.93% 1.12% 4.03% 6.27% 
 Spain 7.50% 4.50% -0.90% 1.80% 5.70% 
 Sweden 4.28% 8.70% -0.80% 3.95% 0.33% 
 UK 12.25% 8.30% -0.30% 4.00% 8.25% 
 avge. EU14 8.78% 6.93% 1.12% 4.03% 4.75% 
__________________________________________________________ 
- Note: No data are available on the returns to bonds and  shares in Austria, Finland , Greece and  Portugal. 
We impute to these countries the average return in the rest of the sample. 
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bonds by 7.66 points and that on equity by 1.85 points. When allowance is made for taxes on 
capital income (a complicated matter we will not address here), the premium on schooling 
will increase significantly. The return differential with bonds is positive in all countries and 
is always above 4.9 points (which is the value corresponding to France). The before-tax return 
to equity, however, is above the rate of return on schooling in three countries, and significantly 
so in Sweden due to a combination of outstanding stock market performance and the lowest 
returns to education in the sample. The premium on human capital, as defined above, is 
positive in all countries, and ranges from 0.33% in Sweden to 8.25% in the UK with a mean 
value of 4.75%24. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
expected return per unit of risk) clearly favour educational investment over shares in the US. Surprisingly, however, 
formal tests for mean-variance spanning suggest that the risk-adjusted returns of schooling dominate those of equities 
only for university education, but not for secondary schooling. Christiansen et al. (2004) construct what are probably 
better measures of wage risk using the average residuals in Mincer equations for specific types of education. They find 
that the risk-return trade-off involved varies a lot with the type of studies but do not compare their results with the returns 
on financial assets. 
On a somewhat different note, Padula and Pistaferri (2001) provide some evidence that introducing risk considerations 
may actually increase the attractiveness of investment in schooling. They find, in particular, that increases in attainment 
tend to lower wage risk and, as a result, increase the (risk-adjusted) rate of return on schooling. (Thanks to G. Brunello 
for providing this reference). 
24. The absence of data on financial returns makes our estimates of the private premium on schooling rather uncertain 
for four countries (Austria, Greece, Finland and Portugal). Notice, however, that the human capital premium in these 
countries would remain over 1.9 percentage points if we assigned to them the highest rate of return on financial assets 
observed in the sample. 
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7 Results for the EU: ii) Fiscal returns 
In this section we will use the equations derived in section 4 to explore the fiscal 
consequences of increasing average attainment by one year in each EU country. We will 
assume that the increase in the direct costs of schooling, including non-tuition grants at the 
existing level, is born entirely by the government [that is, we will use µg' as our measure of 
government expenditure in equations (56) and (57)]. Aside from this, our raw data are the 
same that have already been used to calculate the private returns to schooling in the previous 
section. We will, however, introduce a number of deviations from our previous assumptions to 
try to obtain a more realistic estimate of the impact of schooling on public finances. First, we 
will now take into account the effects of schooling on labour force participation rates. Hence, 
our calculations in this section will apply to a representative individual who may or may not be 
active with probabilities based on observed labour force participation rates, rather than to an 
individual who remains active throughout his student and adult life, as was the case in the 
previous section. 
 
Second, we will try to approximate the general equilibrium effects of schooling on 
wages and employment probabilities. As has already been noted, the estimates of the 
wage (θ ) and employment (p' and q') benefits of schooling reported in Table 7 are partial 
equilibrium estimates that capture expected return to a single individual of staying one more 
year in school holding constant the aggregate attainment level and factor prices. It should be 
expected, however, that the realized marginal returns to schooling will be smaller when the 
government undertakes policies that raise average attainment at the aggregate level. As 
discussed in de la Fuente (2003)25 the required correction to the wage benefits of schooling 
can be approximated by multiplying the estimated value of θ by one minus the share of 
capital in national income, which is around 1/3 in industrial countries. This adjustment, which 
holds the aggregate stock of capital constant and implicitly assumes that there is no capital 
mobility, can be regarded as rather conservative, especially for small countries. For the case 
of the employment and participation parameters we will introduce an ad-hoc correction that 
consists in reducing the original estimates of p' by two thirds and that of q' by one half. 
The correction factor for q' is smaller because the decision to join the labour force does not 
involve an element of competition with other workers for available jobs. 
 
 Our estimates of the fiscal rate of return to schooling are shown in Table A.16 in 
section 6 of Appendix 1, where we also discuss some technical problems that arise in 
connection with the calculation of this rate of return when pensions are taken into account. 
Table 11 shows our estimates of the net present fiscal value per student (NPFV) of an 
additional year of schooling. For this calculation we assume a real discount rate of 3%, 
which is more than twice as large as the observed real return on government bonds in the 
sample (see Table 10) over the last few decades. Both sets of calculations are carried out 
under five alternative sets of assumptions: in scenario [1] we consider only personal taxes 
(including employee social security contributions) and unemployment benefits, in [2] we add 
consumption taxes, in [3] employer social security contributions and in [4] and [5] retirement 
benefits. Both pension scenarios assume the same replacement rate (defined in terms of 
wages at the time of retirement), κ = 67%. In [4], however, we assume that pensions grow at 
the same rate as average wages (ω = g) while in [5] we assume, probably more realistically, 
that pensions are linked to prices and remain constant in real terms (ω = 0). 
                                                                          
25. See in particular section 8 of the Appendix. 
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Table 11: Net present fiscal value of an additional year of schooling 
____________________________________________________________________ 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] DCOST 
  personal 
taxes 
+ consump. 
taxes 
+ employer 
s. sec. contr.
+ pensions 1
(ω = g) 
+ pensions 2
(ω = 0) 
exp. per 
student 
 Austria -4,197 -3,822 -2,393 -5,289 -5,035 8,055 
 Belgium  78 369 3,293 240 527 6,143 
 Denmark -6,694 -6,268 -6,319 -8,110 -7,981 9,166 
 Finland 1,861 3,124 7,261 3,802 4,084 7,434 
 France -2,348 -1,651 1,919 -605 -387 6,407 
 Germany 2,579 3,252 6,123 2,288 2,591 6,619 
 Greece -670 -327 727 -411 -328 2,134 
 Ireland 4,767 6,483 8,890 6,028 6,212 6,132 
 Italy -1,635 -1,247 917 -1,000 -843 4,956 
 Netherlands -1,533 -1,089 -490 -4,154 -3,827 6,170 
 Portugal -1,760 -1,380 -588 -1,253 -1,213 2,827 
 Spain -20 361 2,558 830 961 3,609 
 Sweden -8,995 -9,728 -11,198 -11,967 -11,909 9,446 
 UK 400 1,973 4,373 680 945 6,215 
 avge. EU14 -1,181 -541 1,611 -899 -703 6,267 
____________________________________________________________________ 
- Notes: The real discount rate used to calculate the NPV is 3%. All figures are in US dollars of 2000 at (that year's) 
current exchange rates. The last column gives total expenditure per student in the same units, inclusive of non-tuition 
transfers to households (calculated as µg'Wo). 
Table 12: Recovery rates on educational expenditure 
___________________________________________________________ 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]  
  personal 
taxes 
+ consump. 
taxes 
+ employer 
s. sec. contr.
+ pensions 1
(w = g) 
+ pensions 2 
(w = 0) 
 
 Austria 47.90% 52.55% 70.30% 34.35% 37.50%  
 Belgium  101.27% 106.01% 153.61% 103.90% 108.58%  
 Denmark 26.96% 31.61% 31.06% 11.52% 12.93%  
 Finland 125.04% 142.02% 197.66% 151.15% 154.93%  
 France 63.35% 74.24% 129.95% 90.56% 93.96%  
 Germany 138.96% 149.14% 192.51% 134.58% 139.15%  
 Greece 68.62% 84.67% 134.05% 80.75% 84.64%  
 Ireland 177.74% 205.72% 244.99% 198.31% 201.31%  
 Italy 67.01% 74.83% 118.50% 79.83% 82.99%  
 Netherlands 75.15% 82.35% 92.06% 32.68% 37.98%  
 Portugal 37.75% 51.18% 79.21% 55.68% 57.08%  
 Spain 99.44% 110.00% 170.87% 122.99% 126.63%  
 Sweden 4.77% -2.99% -18.55% -26.69% -26.07%  
 UK 106.43% 131.75% 170.36% 110.93% 115.21%  
 avge. EU14 81.16% 91.37% 125.71% 85.65% 88.78%  
____________________________________________________________ 
- Note: A real d iscount rate of 3% is used  in the calculations. The fraction of d irect expend iture recovered  is 
calculated  as (NPFV+DCOST)/DCOST. 
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The NPFV estimates given in Table 11 can be interpreted as the negative of the net 
real cost of keeping the average student in school for an extra year, that is as (minus one 
times) the difference between the direct resource costs of schooling (DCOST, which are 
shown in the last column of Table 11) and the present value of the net tax revenues this 
expenditure generates. Hence, in the average EU country, the net cost of an extra year 
of schooling is, under the least favourable set of assumptions, roughly 900 dollars. Since 
this figure is considerably smaller than the actual resource costs of education (which 
exceed $6,200), we must conclude that the net tax revenues generated by an increase in 
attainment allow the government to recoup the bulk of its educational outlays. To make the 
same point in a way that is perhaps clearer, Table 12 gives for each country and scenario 
the recovery rate on educational expenditure, defined as the percentage of the direct cost of 
education (including transfers to households) that is recovered through increases in taxes 
and savings on social insurance payments. Figure 6 shows that recovery rates seem 
to be driven mostly by the net wage returns to schooling as measured by θ' = θS'(Xo) - ν. 
Deviations from the fitted regression line reflect differences across countries in expenditure 
per student and in tax rates. 
 
Looking at Tables 11 and 12 (and in particular at the second pension scenario given 
in column [5]), we can divide the countries in our sample into three groups. In the first one, 
comprised only by Sweden, the recovery rate is negative, indicating that the net cost of 
schooling exceeds its direct costs because the present value of induced current and future 
net tax revenues is negative, even without taking into account pension liabilities. This is 
possible, even though increased attainment does indeed raise incomes and therefore tax 
revenues in the future, because it does not do so by enough to compensate for the loss of 
the taxes that young people would pay in the current year, were they to join the labour market 
immediately. In the second group, the present value of induced tax and benefit flows is 
positive, but smaller than the direct costs of education, yielding recovery rates between zero 
and one. Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal fall in this 
group. Finally, in the third group, induced tax flows more than compensate for the direct 
costs of schooling, making the net present fiscal value of a year of schooling positive. This is 
the case in Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Spain and the UK. 
Figure 6: Recovery rate vs. θ' 
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- Note: recovery rates correspond to column [5] in Table 12, i.e. include pensions under the assumption that
they are indexed  to prices. 
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These results suggest that any increase in public educational expenditure required to 
marginally raise current attainement levels would largely pay for itself over the long run 
through higher tax revenues and lower social insurance payments in the average EU country. 
Recovery rates on educational expenditure exceed 50% in all EU countries but four (Sweden, 
Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands), and lie above 100% in six of them. The net fiscal 
surplus per student is considerable in some of these states and can potentially make a 
modest positive contribution to public budgets in the future. 
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8 Conclusion 
In this paper we have constructed estimates of the private and fiscal returns to schooling 
in 14 European countries and analyzed the impact of various public policies on the first of 
these variables. The estimated private returns to a one-year increase in schooling, starting 
from currently observed average attainment levels, cluster between 7.5% and 10% in 
most member states of the EU. Sweden is a clear outlier at the bottom of the distribution, 
possibly as a result of severe wage compression, while the highest returns correspond to 
the UK and Ireland, followed by Portugal and Finland. In practically all European countries, the 
returns to schooling compare quite favourably with those available from standard financial 
assets. Taking as a reference a balanced portfolio of corporate shares and government 
bonds, the premium on education ranges from 0.3% in Sweden to 8.2% in the UK with a 
mean value of 4.7%. 
 
Various public policies have a significant impact on the private return to schooling. 
On average, direct subsidies to education raise returns by 45% while personal taxes and 
unemployment benefits reduce them by 8% and 22% respectively. In most countries, the 
combined effect of all these policies is a net subsidy to education. This subsidy exceeds 30% 
in Denmark, Portugal, Austria and Sweden, and has an average value of 16% in the entire 
sample. 
 
According to our calculations, public expenditure on post-compulsory education is 
at least partly self-financing over the long run in most EU countries. Leaving aside Sweden 
and Denmark, where educational subsidies are particularly generous, recovery ratios on 
public educational expenditure range between 37.5% in Austria and 201% in Ireland, with 
a mean value of 88.8%. This leaves the net budget cost in present value terms of an 
additional year of schooling in the average EU country at 700 US dollars, working under 
conservative assumptions that include full government funding of all educational costs and a 
rather generous provision for induced pension liabilities. 
 
Our results indicate that in most countries the tax system generates only modest 
disincentives to invest in further education at observed average attainment levels. On the the 
other hand, distortions arising from unemployment insurance can be very important in 
countries where unemployment rates are high and a significant fraction of the benefits of 
schooling come through an increase in the probability of employment. From the point of view 
of minimizing such distortions, it would be preferrable to uncap unemployment benefits while 
reducing average replacement rates. Efficiency gains, however, must be balanced against the 
equity considerations that rightly influence the design of the social protection system. 
 
Policy implications regarding educational finance should be drawn with some care, 
particularly in the absence of reliable estimates of social returns that may be used to gauge 
the potential misalignment between private incentives and social needs. We see our finding 
that government expenditure in education largely pays for itself over time in most countries as 
a good reason for governments not to subordinate educational policies to short-term budget 
concerns. In our view, however, the balance of our findings does not necessarily imply that 
additional educational subsidies are called for. For most countries, the premium on human 
capital relative to financial assets is large enough to suggest that the incentives to enroll in 
post-compulsory courses are already quite adequate. This is true in part because existing 
subsidy levels are quite high. 
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APPENDIX 1: DATA AND DETAILED RESULTS 
1. The direct costs of schooling 
This section describes the construction of the direct cost of schooling variables 
(µ,  µs,  µg  and  µg'). As noted in the text, these variables are weighted averages of costs 
per student at the secondary and tertiary levels measured as a fraction of APW earnings. 
The primary data are taken from various recent issues of the OECD's Education at a Glance, 
to which we will refer as EAG. 
a. Secondary education 
Table A.1 summarizes the available data on educational expenditure at the secondary level. 
Column [1] shows total expenditure per student (in public and private educational institutions) 
in 1997 measured as a percentage of GDP per capita and column [2] shows the share of this 
expenditure that is publicly financed. Multiplying [1] by [2] we obtain public expenditure per 
student (column [4]) and private expenditure as a residual (column [3]). The data refer mostly 
to 1997 and the main source is the 2000 edition of Education at a Glance (EAG 2000). 
Exceptions are highlighted in bold type and discussed in the notes to the table and in the 
following paragraph. 
 
 
Table A.1: Expenditure per student as a percentage of GDP per capita 
secondary level 
________________________________________________ 
  [1] [2] [3] [4]  
  total %gov' t private public  
 Austria 36% 97.0% 1.1% 34.9%  
 Belgium* 29% 94.0% 1.7% 27.3%  
 Denmark 28% 98.0% 0.6% 27.4%  
 Finland 25% 99.4% 0.1% 24.9%  
 France 31% 95.0% 1.6% 29.5%  
 Germany 28% 97.0% 0.8% 27.2%  
 Greece 19% 90.2% 1.9% 17.1%  
 Ireland 19% 97.0% 0.6% 18.4%  
 Italy 29% 100.0% 0.0% 29.0%  
 Netherlands 23% 96.0% 0.9% 22.1%  
 Portugal 29% 99.9% 0.0% 29.0%  
 Spain 27% 88.0% 3.2% 23.8%  
 Sweden 27% 100.0% 0.0% 27.0%  
 UK 23% 88.2% 2.7% 20.3%  
 avge. EU14 26.64% 95.7% 1.09% 25.55%  
________________________________________________ 
    - Sources and notes: 
 [1] EAG 2000 (Table B4.2 w ith data for 1997). We use "all secondary" rather than "upper secondary" 
because these data are available for more countries. The one exception is Italy. The data for this country 
refer to 1998 and are taken from EAG 2001. 
 [2]  These data are only available for tertiary stud ies and  for all other levels combined, so we use the 
second  category. The main source is EAG 2000 (Table B2.1 with data for 1997). For this year, the data refer 
to the initial source of funds.  For Finland , Greece, Portugal and  the UK (shown in bold  type), the source is 
EAG 2002 (Table B4.2 with data for 1999). As noted  in the text, these data refer to shares in final 
expenditure.       
 (*) The data for Belgium refer to the Flanders region.
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For most countries, the data on the share of government financing given in 
column [2] refer to the initial source of funds. For the countries shown in bold type, 
however, the data come from a different issue of EAG and refer to final expenditure 
after transfers from the public to the private sector (i.e. describe who pays in the end, and 
not where the money originally came from). For the UK, however, EAG gives the 
share of private (final) expenditure which is financed by public transfers. Hence, we 
subtract these transfers from private spending and add them to public expenditure 
before computing the government's share in the financing of educational institutions. For 
Finland, EAG reports that the amount of such transfers is “negligible”. For the remaining 
countries there is no information on subsidies, and we implicitly assume they are zero. 
Since private final expenditure is extremely low in Portugal the resulting mistake will be 
insignificant. For Greece, however, the margin of error is considerably larger. To indicate this, 
we use bold italics for this country in columns [3] and [4]. As in the text, we will use 
this character type to identify results that are based on incomplete information when this is 
not expected to be a source of substantial errors, and plain bold type to identify results 
where the error caused by incomplete data is potentially important for the calculations. 
 
For Germany, EAG (2000) reports a share of public expenditure of only 76%. It also 
indicates, however, that in this country “nearly all private expenditure is accounted for by 
contributions from the business sector to the dual system of apprenticeship at the upper 
secondary level” (p. 62)26. Since we are interested in the cost of education to households, 
we will treat enterprise contributions as public expenditure. As no specific figure is given for 
enterprise contributions, we will assume a share of “public” expenditure (including business 
contributions) of 97%, which is the value observed in Austria. 
b. Higher education 
Table A.2 replicates Table A.1 for the case of higher education to obtain preliminary 
estimates of total, private and public expenditure per student as a percentage of GDP per 
capita. As above, the available data on the government's share refer to final expenditures for 
the countries shown in bold type in column [2] and to the initial source of funds for the rest. In 
Finland, the share of private expenditure financed by public transfers is negligible. For the 
other countries there is no information on this variable but, given the small size of overall 
private final expenditure, the potential error caused by our implicit assumption that such 
transfers are zero is small. 
                                                                          
26. We thank L. Wössmann for pointing this out. 
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The preliminary figures given in Table A.2 have to be adjusted to eliminate the 
cost of research carried out in universities and to reflect public transfers to students that 
are intended to help defray living expenses and other non-tuition costs. (Notice that our 
preliminary public expenditure figures already incorporate tuition grants since the share 
of government reflects the initial source of funds destined for educational institutions.) The 
data required for these adjustments are given in Table A.3. Column [5] shows the share 
of R&D expenditure in total spending on tertiary-level educational institutions. Column [6] 
shows public subsidies to households to cover student living costs and non-tuition expenses, 
measured as a percentage of GDP per capita. 
 
Bold entries in Table A.3 indicate missing observations that have been estimated in 
various ways. We have imputed to those countries for which the share of R&D is missing 
the values observed in close neighbours or in countries with similar income levels (see the 
notes to the table). When data on subsidies are not available, an approximation has been 
constructed using related information from a different issue of EAG which is shown in 
column [7]. This column gives an estimate of the amount of public subsidies for living costs 
and other non-tuition expenses measured as a fraction of government direct expenditure on 
tertiary educational institutions. The numerator is financial aid to students (scholarships and 
other grants) net of the amount earmarked for the payment of tuition fees when available. 
The bold entries in column [6] are obtained by multiplying [7] by direct government 
expenditure on educational institutions (column [4] in Table A.2). 
Table A.2: Expenditure per student as a percentage of GDP per capita 
tertiary level: i) preliminary estimates 
________________________________________________ 
  [1] [2] [3] [4]  
  total %gov' t private public  
 Austria 43% 98.7% 0.6% 42.4%  
 Belgium* 33% 90.0% 3.3% 29.7%  
 Denmark 29% 99.0% 0.3% 28.7%  
 Finland 35% 97.4% 0.9% 34.1%  
 France 34% 88.0% 4.1% 29.9%  
 Germany 43% 93.0% 3.0% 40.0%  
 Greece 29% 99.9% 0.0% 29.0%  
 Ireland 39% 79.0% 8.2% 30.8%  
 Italy 28% 82.0% 5.0% 23.0%  
 Netherlands 45% 97.0% 1.4% 43.7%  
 Portugal 28% 98.0% 0.6% 27.4%  
 Spain 32% 77.0% 7.4% 24.6%  
 Sweden 64% 91.0% 5.8% 58.2%  
 UK 40% 88.0% 4.8% 35.2%  
 avge. EU15 37.3% 91.3% 3.23% 34.05%  
________________________________________________ 
    - Sources and notes: 
 [1] The source is EAG 2000 (Table B4.2 with data for all tertiary programmes in 1997) except in the 
cases of Italy and  Portugal. The Italian data refer to 1998 and  are taken from EAG 2001. The information 
for Portugal is from EAG 2002 and  refers to 1999. 
 [2]  The m ain source is EAG 2000 (Table B2.1 with data for tertiary education in 1997). For this year, the 
data refer to the initial source of funds. For Austria, Finland and  Greece (shown in bold  type), the source is 
EAG 2002 (Table B4.2 with data for 1999). As in  the previous table, these data refer to shares in final 
expenditure.      
 (*) The data for Belgium refer to the Flanders region.
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Table A.4 shows the adjusted estimates of private, public and total expenditure 
per student at the tertiay level measured as a percentage of GDP per capita. Adjusted 
total expenditure is obtained by subtracting R&D spending from the uncorrected total. 
Adjusted public expenditure is raw public expenditure minus research expenditure 
(which we attribute exclusively to the government) plus transfers to students for non-tuition 
costs. Adjusted private expenditure is gross private expenditure minus subsidies for 
non-tuition costs. Bold italics are used for total and public costs in Austria, Italy and 
Portugal because, as noted above, there is no data on research expenditure by universities. 
Finally, the column labeled adjusted public' is calculated by adding subsidies to the adjusted 
total costs. This variable tries to approximate the public cost per student of an increase in 
enrollments totally financed by the government under the assumption that the current level of 
non-tuition related transfers is maintained. 
Table A.3: Expenditure per student as a percentage of GDP per capita 
tertiary level: ii) data for adjustments 
______________________________________ 
 [5] [6]** [7]   
 sh. R&D subsidies sh. subs.   
 Austria 0.381 6.62%*   
 Belgium  0.367 5.62% 0.189  
 Denmark 0.272 17.42%   
 Finland 0.356 7.02%   
 France 0.156 1.82%   
 Germany 0.381 4.67%   
 Greece 0.227 1.02% 0.035  
 Ireland 0.164 7.44%   
 Italy 0.241 2.73% 0.119  
 Netherlands 0.393 7.78%   
 Portugal 0.227 1.28%   
 Spain 0.241 1.46%   
 Sweden 0.480 22.72%   
 UK 0.359 6.92%   
 avge. EU14 0.303 6.75%    
______________________________________ 
   - Sources and notes: 
 [5] EAG 2002 (Table B6.2 with data for tertiary education in 1999). Since no data are available for 
Austria, Italy and  Portugal, we assign to these countries the values observed  in Germany, Spain and 
Greece, respectively. 
 [6]  EAG 2000 (Table B3.2 with data for 1997, except for Germany, where it is for 1996). No data are 
available for Belgium, Greece and  Ireland . The figures given for these countries are estimated  as explained 
in the text using [7]. 
 (*) For Austria, there is no breakdown between subsid ies earmarked  for the payment of tuition fees 
and  the rest. We assume that all subsid ies are for living costs, as the data in Table A.2 suggests that the 
government pays d irectly for the bulk of the costs of educational institutions. 
 (**) The information available in EAG includes the fraction of total transfers (includ ing those for tuition 
costs) that corresponds to student loans. We assume that only 25% of the amount of the loan is a subsidy 
and  that this subsidy finances tuition and non-tuition costs in the same proportion. To correct the original 
figure for non-tuition transfers, we reduce it by one fourth of the share of loans in total transfers. 
 [7] EAG 2002 (Table B5.2 with information for tertiary education in 1999).
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c. Total expenditure 
We average expenditure per student across educational levels, using a weight of 2/3 for 
secondary schooling and of 1/3 for higher education. The results are shown in Table A.5, 
which gives average expenditure per student as a percentage of GDP per capita. For 
the rate of return calculations we will want to express total expenditure per student 
as a fraction of APW gross earnings. To obtaine the values of µ, µs, µg and µg' shown in 
Table 7 in the text, we multiply the figures shown in columns [1]-[4] of Table A.5 by the 
ratio of GDP per capita to APW gross earnings, which is shown in column [5]. This ratio is 
calculated using data for 1999 taken from the country chapters of the OECD's Benefit 
Systems and Work Incentives 1999 and from the 2002 edition of Education at a Glance 
(Table X2.2). 
 
Entries in bold italics in columns [1] to [4] are carried over from previous tables. The 
entry for Portugal in column [4] is shown in bold type because Portuguese APW earnings 
are atypically low relative to GDP per capita. As a result, Portuguese expenditure per student 
will appear to be rather high when normalized by APW wages. Since we are not sure reported 
Portuguese APW earnings are an adequate indicator of average wages and since their use 
will have a noticeable effect on the rate of return calculations, the values of the cost variables 
reported in Table 7 for Portugal, as well as the APW wage, Wo, will be shown in bold type to 
indicate that these data may be misleading. 
Table A.4: Expenditure per student as a percentage of GDP per capita 
tertiary level: iii) adjusted estimates 
________________________________________________ 
  [8] [9] [10] [11]  
  adjusted 
total 
adjusted 
private 
adjusted 
public 
adjusted 
public'  
 
 Austria 26.64% -6.06% 32.70% 33.26%  
 Belgium  20.90% -2.32% 23.22% 26.52%  
 Denmark 21.10% -17.13% 38.23% 38.52%  
 Finland 22.54% -6.11% 28.66% 29.57%  
 France 28.68% 2.26% 26.42% 30.50%  
 Germany 26.64% -1.66% 28.30% 31.31%  
 Greece 22.41% -0.99% 23.40% 23.43%  
 Ireland 32.61% 0.75% 31.86% 40.05%  
 Italy 21.25% 2.31% 18.94% 23.98%  
 Netherlands 27.33% -6.43% 33.76% 35.11%  
 Portugal 21.64% -0.72% 22.36% 22.92%  
 Spain 24.28% 5.90% 18.39% 25.75%  
 Sweden 33.27% -16.96% 50.23% 55.99%  
 UK 25.62% -2.12% 27.75% 32.55%  
 avge. EU14 25.35% -3.52% 28.87% 32.10%  
________________________________________________ 
    - Note: the ad justed  estimates shown in columns [8] to [10] are calculated  as follows: 
  ad justed  total = total * (1 - sh. R&D), i.e. [8] = [1] * (1 - [5]) 
  ad justed  private = private - subsid ies,  i.e. [9] = [3] - [6] 
  ad justed  public = public - (sh.R&D*total) + subsid ies, i.e. [10] = [4] - ([1]*[5]) + [6] 
  adjusted public' = adjusted total + subsidies,  i.e [11] = [8] + [6
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2. Further details on the estimation of tax and benefit parameters 
The country chapters of OECD (2000) and OECD (2001) contain a description of the 
personal tax system (including employee social security contributions) in member states 
in 1999 and 2000 respectively. OECD (2000) also describes the social protection system in 
each country, focusing on unemployment benefits and social assistance but not on pension 
schemes, and describes in greater detail than OECD (2001) the tax treatment of social 
benefits. 
 
Both publications contain a set of tables at the end of each chapter where they 
describe the tax and benefit position of several types of representative individuals, including 
a single person with no children whose earnings in employment were equal to APW 
wages, and some of the relevant tax or replacement rates. For a number of countries, the 
description of the tax system is ambiguous or incomplete at times and we have been 
unable to reproduce exactly the tax and benefit amounts given in the tables, but the 
discrepancies are minor in all cases. Whenever possible, we have relied on the tables (or on 
summary tables containing average and marginal tax rates that are included in the OECD's 
on-line tax database) rather than on the text, as it seems reasonable to assume that 
the OECD staff who produce these tables have more information about the peculiarities of tax 
and benefit systems than is contained in the descriptions given in these publications. 
 
Thus, marginal and average tax rates and employer social security contributions 
for employed workers have been taken directly from the OECD tax database and coincide 
with those given in the appropriate country tables of OECD (2001a). The average tax rate 
applicable to unemployed workers (τu) and the average gross replacement ratio (b, defined as 
the ratio of gross income out of employment to before-tax income in employment) have also 
been generally constructed by using directly the amounts given in the end-of-chapter tables 
in OECD (2000). The average replacement ratio is obtained by adding housing benefits to 
unemployment insurance and dividing the result by APW wages. The average tax rate is 
Table A.5: Expenditure per student as a % of GDP per capita 
weighted average of secondary and (adjusted) tertiary levels 
_______________________________________________________________ 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
  total private public public'  GDPpc/APW 
earnings 
 Austria 32.88% -1.30% 34.18% 35.09% 1.075 
 Belgium  26.30% 0.39% 25.91% 28.17% 0.816 
 Denmark 25.70% -5.34% 31.04% 31.51% 0.832 
 Finland 24.18% -1.94% 26.12% 26.52% 0.947 
 France 30.23% 1.79% 28.44% 30.83% 1.084 
 Germany 27.55% 0.01% 27.54% 29.10% 0.773 
 Greece 20.14% 0.91% 19.23% 20.48% 1.071 
 Ireland 23.54% 0.63% 22.91% 26.02% 1.156 
 Italy 26.42% 0.77% 25.65% 27.33% 0.957 
 Netherlands 24.44% -1.53% 25.97% 27.04% 0.876 
 Portugal 26.55% -0.22% 26.77% 26.97% 1.488 
 Spain 26.09% 4.13% 21.97% 26.58% 0.983 
 Sweden 29.09% -5.65% 34.74% 36.66% 1.026 
 UK 23.87% 1.10% 22.77% 26.18% 0.852 
 avge. EU14 26.21% -0.45% 26.66% 28.46% 0.995 
_______________________________________________________________ 
    - Note: Weighted average of the values shown in Tables A.1 and A.4 with weights of 2/3 and 1/3 respectively. (For 
public' we use column [1] of Table A.1 and column [4] of Table A.4). In the case of Germany, the public expenditure 
shown in column [3] includes enterprise contributions to vocational training programmes. The contribution of this 
item to combined or total educational expenditure per student amounts to 3.03% of APW gross earnings. 
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calculated by dividing total tax payments (personal taxes and social security) by the sum of 
unemployment and housing benefits. The only country where we have deviated slightly from 
the end-of-chapter tables is Italy. For this country, we treat the housing benefit as a tax 
deduction (which is the form that it takes according to the description in the text), rather than 
as a cash payment, which seems to be the way it is treated in the end-of-chapter table. 
 
We have had to use the description of the national tax and benefit systems to 
calculate the average tax rate on student income from part-time work and the marginal 
tax rate on unemployment benefits. In the case of students, our calculations are  based on 
OECD (2001a). In most countries existing tax allowances or zero-rate brackets are such that 
student part-time workers earning 20% of APW wages will pay no income tax. The exception 
are the Nordic countries, where they would be subject to proportional local taxes. In 
most countries, however, employee social security contributions would have to be paid at 
standard rates. The exceptions to this norm are the UK, which exempts wages below a 
certain level from these contributions, and Ireland where they are exempted from most but 
not all social contributions. In the case of Denmark, we have assumed that young part-time 
workers opt out of certain unemployment and pension schemes that appear to be voluntary. 
 
Marginal tax rates for unemployed workers are constructed using the information 
given in OECD (2000) taking into account the deductability of social security contributions 
from income tax where appropriate. Since this parameter is only relevant when the marginal 
replacement ratio, B', is different from zero (because it enters the calculations only as a 
product with B'), we have not calculated it for countries where benefits are paid at a fixed 
rate or benefit ceilings apply to our reference worker. As noted in the text, for this calculation 
we have treated housing benefits as lump sum payments. As a result, our marginal tax 
rates do not incorporate the loss of these benefits that would result from increases in 
unemployment insurance payments (reflecting higher wages in previous employment). 
In order for our calculations to be consistent with the end-of-chapter tables in terms of 
the total tax due, we have assumed that in the Netherlands the unemployed only 
contribute to the general social security schemes, and not to employee schemes, and that in 
Finland the unemployed are subject only to contributions to the sickness insurance fund 
and not to the old age pension fund. The second assumption contradicts the text, that states 
that both types of contributions are levied on the unemployed. In the case of France, the 
marginal tax rate has been computed numerically, by calculating the tax increase generated 
by a one-franc increase in gross benefits. The reason is that the tax system in this country is 
quite complicated in a number of respects that include the (partial) deductability of social 
contributions from income tax, the calculation of tax deductions and the final correction of 
income tax (décote) that reduces the total tax burden at low income levels but greatly 
increases the marginal tax rate. 
 
The marginal gross replacement ratio (B'), and the net replacement ratio in the 
case of Austria and Germany, have also been calculated using the description of benefit 
systems given in OECD (2000). In these two countries, unemployment benefits are not 
taxed and are set as a fixed fraction (β) of after-tax income in employment. In the 
remaining countries, benefits are either paid at fixed rates or are proportional to gross 
income in employment, possibly with a ceiling that we have taken into account in our 
calculations (by setting B' equal to zero when the ceiling is binding for our reference 
individual). Finland uses a mixed system with a fixed and a variable component. In this 
country, daily benefits are equal to the sum of three components: a basic, fixed-rate 
benefit (FRB), plus 42% of daily reference earnings in excess of the basic benefit, plus 20% of 
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daily reference earnings in excess of a higher amount (which is still lower than the reference 
earnings of our representative individual). Reference earnings are defined as 95% of gross 
daily earnings. Hence, the marginal rate for benefits corresponding to APW wages is given 
by 0.95*(0.42+0.20) = 0.589. 
3. Correction for differential student employment probabilities and activity rates 
Casual observation suggests that, at least in some countries, finding a part-time or summer 
job while attending school may be harder than finding a full-time job, and that the propensity 
of students to enter the labour market tends to be much lower than that of those who have 
completed their education. Since these factors can have an important effect on the 
opportunity cost of education and hence on its private return, they should be taken into 
account in our calculations. 
 
To calculate the required correction factors (η and ηq) we have used data on 
the probability of employment of the 20 to 24 age group in 1998 taken from the 2003 
edition of Education at a Glance. Columns [1] to [4] of Table A.6 show the probability of 
employment of this group conditional on participation in the labour force (p) and its labour 
force participation rate (q), distinguishing between those enrolled in educational institutions 
and those who have already completed their formal schooling. Columns [5] and [6] show 
preliminary estimates of the correction factors, η and ηq. These variables are constructed by 
dividing the relevant employment probability or participation rate for those attending school 
by its counterpart for those out of school. 
 
To go from Table A.10 to Table 7 in the text (which shows the values of the 
correction factors that are used in the rate of return calculations), we assign a value of 1 to 
countries where the preliminary estimate of η shown here exceeds that value –that is, we 
assume that, other things equal, it is never easier to find part-time employment as a student 
than a full-time job. 
 
 
Table A.6: Probability of employment, population 20-24 in and out of school 
________________________________________________________________ 
                                                             in education                  not in education                   η = ratio in/not 
in edu. 
  [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] 
  p q p q  η ηq 
 Austria 92.45% 19.34% 94.62% 87.05%  0.977 0.222 
 Belgium  87.50% 16.33% 86.12% 89.07%  1.016 0.183 
 Denmark 90.91% 69.62% 92.93% 91.93%  0.978 0.757 
 Finland 82.40% 46.38% 83.86% 82.00%  0.983 0.566 
 France 95.12% 22.95% 79.57% 89.46%  1.195 0.257 
 Germany 98.37% 52.42% 89.69% 83.41%  1.097 0.628 
 Greece 65.79% 10.38% 74.17% 85.35%  0.887 0.122 
 Ireland 93.22% 20.85% 94.98% 91.63%  0.982 0.228 
 Italy 64.00% 12.95% 75.21% 77.52%  0.851 0.167 
 Netherlands 95.35% 62.50% 96.44% 89.94%  0.989 0.695 
 Portugal 91.55% 19.94% 91.33% 91.30%  1.002 0.218 
 Spain 74.26% 22.44% 82.39% 89.82%  0.901 0.250 
 Sweden 85.29% 32.69% 90.43% 91.27%  0.943 0.358 
 UK 93.41% 54.33% 91.18% 85.39%  1.024 0.636 
 average EU14 85.94% 34.14% 86.79% 87.55%  0.988 0.390 
________________________________________________________________ 
 - Source: EAG 2003 (Table C4.1) w ith data for 2001. 
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4. Academic failure rates 
As noted in the text, we distinguish between completed school grades, S, and time spent 
in school, X where S = S(X) with 0 < S'(X) < 1. To calculate the rate of return we need to 
estimate Xo and S'(Xo). To do this properly, we would need data on repetition and drop-out 
rates at different levels of schooling. Since these data are apparently not available, we have 
constructed a very rough approximation of year-by-year drop out probabilities using the data 
provided by the OECD (EAG 2002) on upper secondary and university survival rates. 
 
We will assume that whenever a student starts one of these cycles but leaves school 
without completing it, the last year spent in school is wasted, and that this is the only type of 
academic failure that takes place. This is clearly incorrect for two reasons that will generate 
opposing biases in our estimates. First, we are ignoring repeaters, which will lead us to 
underestimate failure rates and effective completion times and, second, we are not taking into 
account that students may leave in mid-cycle after successfully completing a grade in order 
to take up a job or for other reasons. Since the first of these effects can be expected to be 
greater than the second one, it is likely that we are underestimating failure rates. 
 
Under our assumptions, we can approximate S' by the one-year probability of 
survival in school, which we will denote by σ. The OECD provides estimates of survival rates 
in tertiary education that are calculated as the ratio between the number of graduates in 
a given year and the number of incoming students in the typical year of entrance into 
the programme. These estimates, which are shown in column [1] of Table A.7, reflect the 
probabability of survival during the entire duration of the university cycle, that is, 
the probability that a student who enters university will eventually graduate. Calling the 
overall survival rate  Σ, denoting by  d the theoretical duration of university, and assuming 
that the probability of failure is the same for all years in the cycle, we have Σ = σd, which 
can be solved for the one-year survival probability,  σ = Exp(ln Σ/d). Then, the expected 
(actual) duration of university can be approximated by D = d/σ, where 1/σ is the average 
time it takes to complete a grade. The original data and the results of the calculations are 
shown in Table A.7. The missing observation for Greece is filled by setting the value of σ  for 
this country equal to the average value of those corresponding to Portugal and Spain. 
 
For Greece there is no data, so I set the value of σ for this country equal to the 
average of Portugal and Spain. 
 
For the case of upper secondary schooling, we proceed in the same way after 
estimating the overall survival rate (which the OECD does not provide) as the ratio between 
the gross graduation rate in a given year and the net enrollment ratio in secondary education 
at age 15 three years earlier. The first of these variables, which is defined as the ratio of upper 
secondary graduates to the total population of the theoretically relevant age, measures the 
output of graduates, while the second one approximates the intake of students in early years 
of this cycle. The data and the results are shown in Table A.8. For the UK there are no data 
on graduation rates, so we assume that σ has the same value as in Ireland.  
 
Finally, the value of S'(Xo) used in our calculations is the weighted average of 
the estimated values of σ at the upper secondary and university levels, with weights 
of 2/3 and 1/3 respectively. 
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5. Detailed results: private returns 
Tables A.9 and A.10 report the results of the participation and employment probits 
discussed in section 5. In both cases, the coefficients we report are not the direct 
estimates of the original parameters of the probit model, but the estimated marginal 
effects (calculated at the sample means of all the regressors) that measure the expected 
change in the relevant probability in response to a marginal increase in each of the 
explanatory variables. 
 
Table A.7 : Estimates of university survival rates
_________________________________________________ 
  whole 
cycle duration 
yearly 
survival 
years per 
grade 
adjusted 
duration   
  Σ d σ 1/σ D   
 Austria 0.59 4 0.876 1.141 4.564   
 Belgium  0.60 4 0.880 1.136 4.545   
 Denmark 0.69 4 0.911 1.097 4.389   
 Finland 0.75 5 0.944 1.059 5.296   
 France 0.59 4 0.876 1.141 4.564   
 Germany 0.70 4 0.915 1.093 4.373   
 Greece  4 0.893 1.120 4.480   
 Ireland 0.85 4 0.960 1.041 4.166   
 Italy 0.42 5 0.841 1.189 5.947   
 Netherlands 0.69 5 0.928 1.077 5.385   
 Portugal 0.49 4 0.837 1.195 4.781   
 Spain 0.77 5 0.949 1.054 5.268   
 Sweden 0.48 4 0.832 1.201 4.806   
 UK 0.83 4 0.954 1.048 4.191   
 average EU14   0.900 1.114 4.768   
______________________________________________________________________ 
- Sources: Theoretical durations are from de la Fuente and Doménech (2002, Table 4). Σ is taken from EAG (2002) 
(Table A2.2, survival rates for all tertiary type A programmes, with data for 2000). The only exceptions are Portugal 
and Greece. For Portugal, the data are taken from EAG (2000) and refer to 1993.
Table A.8: Estimates of upper secondary survival rates
______________________________________________________________________ 
 graduation 
rate 
enrollment 
at 15 
whole 
cycle 
duration yearly 
prob. 
years per 
grade 
adjusted 
duration 
 
   Σ d σ 1/σ D  
Austria 0.7 0.94 0.745 4 0.929 1.076 4.306  
Belgium  0.79 0.97 0.814 3 0.934 1.071 3.212  
Denmark 0.96 0.98 0.980 4 0.995 1.005 4.021  
Finland 0.91 1 0.910 3 0.969 1.032 3.096  
France 0.85 0.96 0.885 3 0.960 1.041 3.124  
Germany 0.92 0.98 0.939 3 0.979 1.021 3.064  
Greece 0.83 0.92 0.902 3 0.966 1.035 3.105  
Ireland 0.76 0.97 0.784 3 0.922 1.085 3.254  
Italy 0.79 0.86 0.919 5 0.983 1.017 5.086  
Netherlands 0.95 0.99 0.960 2 0.980 1.021 2.042  
Portugal 0.56 0.9 0.622 4 0.888 1.126 4.504  
Spain 0.67 0.94 0.713 4 0.919 1.088 4.353  
Sweden 0.71 0.97 0.732 3 0.901 1.110 3.329  
UK  1  3 0.922 1.085 3.254  
average EU14     0.946 1.058 3.554  
______________________________________________________________________ 
- Sources: Theoretical durations are from de la Fuente and  Doménech (2002, Table 4). Gross graduation 
rates from EAG 2003 (Table A1.1 w ith data correspond ing generally to 2001), and net enrollment rates 
from EAG 2000 (Table C1.3, w ith data for 1998).  
Notes: for Austria and the Netherlands, the total (unduplicated) graduation rate is missing; I add up graduation rates 
across programme types, which may introduce some double counting. For Greece I use graduation rates for 1998 
taken from EAG 2000 because the 2003 figures give very low graduation rates that seem implausible. For Portugal, I 
also use EAG 2000, as graduation data are missing in EAG 2003. For the UK there is no data on graduation rates, so 
I  assume σ has the same value as in Ireland.
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Table A.9: Marginal effects in the employment probit 
___________________________________________________________ 
  S potexp potexp2 male no. of observ. 
predicted 
prob.  
 Austria 0.00381 0.00074 0.00000 0.03210 5883 0.9566  
  (2.74) (0.52) (0.01) (3.82)    
 Belgium 0.01671 0.00384 -0.00004 0.04398 4201 0.9282  
  (7.51) (1.48) (0.65) (3.52)    
 Denmark 0.00531 0.00002 0.00001 0.01521 4001 0.9486  
  (3.54) (0.02) (0.27) (2.05)    
 Finland 0.01732 0.00622 -0.00006 0.01981 7201 0.8816  
  (9.32) (2.43) (1.19) (2.26)    
 France 0.01759 0.00763 -0.00008 0.04000 9184 0.9267  
  (10.99) (4.55) (2.03) (4.91)    
 Germany 0.00670 -0.00094 0.00003 0.01723 10314 0.9413  
  (5.10) (0.82) (0.89) (2.87)    
 Greece 0.01338 0.01753 -0.00023 0.11621 8801 0.8859  
  (8.62) (9.99) (5.96) (8.32)    
 Ireland 0.02376 0.00216 0.00002 -0.02042 5746 0.9174  
  (10.70) (1.46) (0.52) (1.36)    
 Italy 0.02085 0.02284 -0.00028 0.08986 14125 0.8581  
  (15.62) (12.88) (7.22) (9.08)    
 Netherlands 0.00588 -0.00061 0.00003 0.02130 7472 0.9614  
  (4.39) (0.69) (1.38) (4.42)    
 Portugal 0.00421 0.00495 -0.00006 0.02740 8903 0.9579  
  (4.51) (4.21) (2.58) (4.20)    
 Spain 0.02451 0.01549 -0.00016 0.10596 12438 0.8005  
  (14.74) (7.64) (3.71) (8.39)    
 Sweden 0.01558 0.01010 -0.00015 0.00540 7625 0.8989  
  (9.66) (8.20) (5.88) (0.75)    
 UK 0.00779 0.00131 0.00001 -0.02254 5528 0.9462  
  (5.69) (1.49) (0.29) (3.61)    
___________________________________________________________ 
- Explanatory variables: S = years of schooling: potexp = potential experience; male = dummy variable, it is 
equal to 1 for males and to 0 for females.  
-Note: t statistics in parentheses below each coefficient. Predicted prob. is the model's pred iction for the 
probability of employment at the mean values of all regressors. 
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The upper panels of Tables A.11 and A.12 show the raw and all-in rates of return 
to schooling and their four cost and benefit “components”. The lower panels display the 
normalized values of these variables. To interpret this table, recall the rate of return formula 
derived in Section 2 of the text which, ommitting the pensions term, can be written 
 
(29') 
  
R
1− e−RHo = R' ≡
θnet + p' net
OPPC + DIRC ≡
NUM
DENOM
 
 
In this expression, θnet  and  p'net capture the net after-tax benefits of a marginal 
increase in schooling that are linked, respectively, to higher earnings and to higher 
employment probabilities, while OPPC and DIRC measure the opportunity and direct costs of 
schooling, with all variables measured as fractions of the expected after-tax earnings of 
an adult worker. Thus, NUM measures the total payoff to an additional year of schooling 
and DENOM its total cost. (Notice that θnet  and  p'net are normalized by the average value 
of their sum, NUM, and OPPC and DIRC  are normalized by the average value of DENOM). 
Table A.10: Marginal effects in the participation probit 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 S potexp potexp2 male married married*
male 
children children*
male 
Austria 0.01412 0.03168 -0.00090 0.04690 0.00346 0.10533 -0.12881 0.22000 
 (5.76) (16.12) (20.63) (2.29) (0.19) (3.99) (6.44) (8.14) 
Belgium 0.02762 0.03790 -0.00099 0.06309 0.00906 0.17848 -0.04683 0.07769 
 (11.58) (16.12) (18.66) (2.55) (0.47) (5.69) (2.20) (2.22) 
Denmark 0.01074 0.02174 -0.00056 0.01729 0.01998 0.09344 -0.06255 0.06286 
 (5.00) (11.92) (14.27) (0.81) (1.19) (4.17) (3.62) (2.44) 
Finland 0.01605 0.04439 -0.00095 0.03584 0.08624 -0.01168 -0.08830 0.12441 
 (7.82) (29.52) (29.88) (2.31) (5.34) (0.48) (5.16) (6.12) 
France 0.02729 0.04423 -0.00107 0.02704 -0.05936 0.18942 -0.11084 0.17617 
 (13.44) (29.66) (33.63) (1.56) (4.00) (9.59) (7.61) (8.21) 
Germany 0.01617 0.02731 -0.00078 0.01553 -0.02672 0.09744 -0.20522 0.16018 
 (8.69) (19.57) (25.68) (1.01) (2.07) (5.47) (15.00) (10.22) 
Greece 0.01453 0.03535 -0.00083 0.01155 -0.12543 0.37983 -0.10487 0.20072 
 (8.10) (20.40) (24.37) (0.65) (6.66) (17.86) (5.66) (6.25) 
Ireland 0.03677 0.02559 -0.00068 0.16867 -0.08166 0.28036 -0.16513 0.14284 
 (12.87) (11.69) (15.24) (8.53) (3.61) (10.39) (8.17) (4.22) 
Italy 0.02213 0.05138 -0.00115 0.04667 -0.16309 0.31393 -0.09557 0.18048 
 (16.13) (32.94) (37.27) (3.54) (10.46) (19.25) (6.60) (7.30) 
Netherl. 0.01917 0.02969 -0.00089 0.00131 -0.01937 0.18805 -0.23483 0.18086 
 (7.14) (16.28) (22.84) (0.25) (0.90) (8.87) (14.94) (8.99) 
Portugal 0.01405 0.03395 -0.00073 0.08731 0.00954 0.20149 -0.03735 0.10261 
 (6.47) (21.06) (23.96) (5.68) (0.63) (10.25) (2.25) (3.81) 
Spain 0.02564 0.05237 -0.00115 0.04758 -0.19008 0.37001 -0.10246 0.16359 
 (15.07) (32.29) (35.51) (3.32) (11.65) (20.41) (6.74) (6.22) 
Sweden 0.009602 0.023926 -0.000488 0.026965 0.056125 -0.003068 -0.023953 0.051618
 (6.53) (23.90) (22.51) (3.11) (6.07) (0.22) (2.21) (3.72) 
UK 0.00671 0.01674 -0.00053 0.03290 0.04715 0.11469 -0.24850 0.10363 
 (2.68) (9.44) (14.65) (1.28) (3.39) (5.28) (14.24) (4.80) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
- Explanatory variables: S = years of schooling: potexp = potential experience; male = dummy variable, it is 
equal to 1 for males and  to 0 for females; married  = dummy variable, equal to 1 for married  ind ividuals or 
those living in consensual unions w ith other persons; children = d ummy variable for ind ividuals with 
child ren under the age of twelve. 
-Note: t statistics in parentheses below each coefficient. 
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Table A.11: Raw return to schooling and its components 
 
a. Observed values 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 rno govt  NUM θnet  p' net  DENOM OPPC DIRC 
Ireland 10.98%  0.091 0.071 0.020 1.044 0.669 0.375 
UK 9.94%  0.076 0.069 0.007 0.965 0.689 0.277 
Finland 9.19%  0.069 0.054 0.015 0.956 0.650 0.306 
Spain 8.91%  0.066 0.045 0.020 0.955 0.602 0.353 
Germany 8.32%  0.064 0.058 0.006 0.974 0.692 0.282 
Greece 8.28%  0.061 0.049 0.011 0.967 0.668 0.299 
Italy 7.31%  0.055 0.038 0.018 1.004 0.659 0.345 
France 7.25%  0.062 0.048 0.015 1.117 0.679 0.438 
Belgium  7.20%  0.055 0.041 0.014 0.966 0.684 0.283 
Portugal 6.87%  0.063 0.060 0.003 1.242 0.691 0.551 
Austria 6.22%  0.057 0.054 0.003 1.176 0.710 0.466 
Netherlands 6.11%  0.048 0.043 0.005 0.993 0.710 0.283 
Denmark 5.08%  0.039 0.034 0.005 0.987 0.698 0.288 
Sweden 3.21%  0.028 0.016 0.012 1.068 0.659 0.409 
avge. EU14 7.56%  0.059 0.048 0.011 1.029 0.675 0.354 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
b. Normalized values 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 rno govt  NUM θnet  p' net  DENOM OPPC DIRC 
Ireland 145.3  153.9 120.2 33.6 101.5 65.0 36.5 
UK 131.6  127.2 116.2 11.0 93.8 66.9 26.9 
Finland 121.6  116.3 91.1 25.2 92.9 63.2 29.7 
Spain 117.9  110.3 75.8 34.5 92.8 58.5 34.3 
Germany 110.1  107.0 97.3 9.7 94.6 67.3 27.4 
Greece 109.6  102.2 83.1 19.1 94.0 64.9 29.1 
Italy 96.7  93.3 63.7 29.5 97.6 64.0 33.6 
France 95.9  105.0 80.2 24.8 108.6 66.0 42.6 
Belgium  95.2  91.8 68.6 23.2 93.9 66.4 27.5 
Portugal 90.9  105.9 100.3 5.6 120.7 67.1 53.6 
Austria 82.3  96.6 91.4 5.3 114.3 69.0 45.3 
Netherlands 80.9  80.2 71.6 8.6 96.5 69.0 27.5 
Denmark 67.3  65.0 57.2 7.8 95.9 67.9 28.0 
Sweden 42.5  47.2 26.4 20.7 103.8 64.0 39.8 
avge 100.0  100.0 81.5 18.5 100.0 65.6 34.4 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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Table A.12: Observed (all-in) return to schooling and its components 
 
a. Observed values 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 robs  NUM θnet  p' net  DENOM OPPC DIRC 
Ireland 12.25%  0.050 0.047 0.003 0.497 0.484 0.013 
UK 11.03%  0.045 0.034 0.011 0.512 0.502 0.010 
Finland 10.30%  0.046 0.046 0.001 0.573 0.578 -0.005 
Spain 9.98%  0.034 0.031 0.003 0.434 0.459 -0.025 
Germany 9.18%  0.042 0.037 0.005 0.599 0.586 0.014 
Greece 9.13%  0.027 0.025 0.001 0.368 0.368 0.000 
Italy 8.63%  0.036 0.033 0.003 0.538 0.512 0.026 
France 8.52%  0.033 0.032 0.001 0.488 0.507 -0.018 
Belgium  8.44%  0.031 0.024 0.007 0.485 0.475 0.010 
Portugal 7.99%  0.018 0.017 0.001 0.288 0.348 -0.060 
Austria 7.50%  0.036 0.032 0.004 0.644 0.588 0.056 
Netherlands 7.47%  0.021 0.018 0.003 0.358 0.354 0.004 
Denmark 6.95%  0.021 0.021 0.001 0.391 0.409 -0.018 
Sweden 4.28%  0.013 0.010 0.003 0.389 0.468 -0.080 
avge. EU14 8.78%  0.032 0.029 0.003 0.471 0.477 -0.005 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
b. Normalized values 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 robs  NUM θnet  p' net  DENOM OPPC DIRC 
UK 139.6  154.7 146.3 8.4 105.4 102.7 2.7 
Ireland 125.7  140.6 105.7 34.9 108.7 106.6 2.1 
Portugal 117.3  144.5 142.7 1.8 121.6 122.6 -1.0 
Finland 113.8  107.3 96.4 10.9 92.1 97.3 -5.2 
Greece 104.6  132.1 116.7 15.4 127.1 124.3 2.9 
Germany 104.0  82.8 78.7 4.2 78.2 78.2 0.0 
France 98.3  112.9 102.7 10.2 114.2 108.7 5.5 
Austria 97.0  102.0 99.2 2.8 103.6 107.5 -3.9 
Italy 96.2  97.9 75.1 22.8 102.8 100.7 2.1 
Denmark 91.1  55.2 52.2 3.0 61.1 73.8 -12.7 
Spain 85.4  113.0 99.9 13.1 136.5 124.7 11.9 
Belgium  85.2  65.3 56.5 8.9 75.9 75.0 0.9 
Netherlands 79.2  66.3 64.5 1.7 83.0 86.8 -3.8 
Sweden 48.8  39.6 31.7 7.9 82.5 99.3 -16.9 
avge 100.0  100.0 90.4 9.6 100.0 101.1 -1.1 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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Table A.13 shows estimates of the private rate of return to schooling under each of 
the scenarios discussed in section 3 of the text. The upper block of the table gives the actual 
rates of return, and the lower one a set of normalized rates of return that are obtained by 
setting the average value for each scenario to 100. Table A.14 shows the change in the rate 
of return as we move across scenarios (i.e. the tax or subsidy wedges defined in the text) and 
Table A.15 converts these wedges into the implied subsidy or tax rates by dividing them by 
the rate of return in the no-government scenario. 
 
 
 
Table A.13: Net private rates of return to schooling under different scenarios 
____________________________________________________________ 
  NO GOV'T +subsidies + taxes OBS 
+ benefits 
pensions  
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]  
 Austria 6.22% 10.35% 8.96% 8.52% 8.90%  
 Belgium  7.20% 9.91% 9.88% 7.47% 7.93%  
 Denmark 5.08% 7.87% 9.16% 7.99% 8.27%  
 Finland 9.19% 13.31% 12.15% 9.98% 10.17%  
 France 7.25% 11.00% 10.59% 8.63% 8.85%  
 Germany 8.32% 11.32% 9.97% 9.13% 9.47%  
 Greece 8.28% 11.16% 10.22% 9.18% 9.34%  
 Ireland 10.98% 15.82% 12.40% 11.03% 11.13%  
 Italy 7.31% 10.46% 10.08% 8.44% 8.65%  
 Netherlands 6.11% 8.73% 7.98% 6.95% 7.65%  
 Portugal 6.87% 11.44% 10.82% 10.30% 10.38%  
 Spain 8.91% 12.24% 11.59% 7.50% 7.77%  
 Sweden 3.21% 6.48% 7.18% 4.28% 4.76%  
 UK 9.94% 13.07% 13.16% 12.25% 12.32%  
 avge. EU14 7.56% 11.05% 10.43% 8.78% 9.01%  
 
  NO GOV'T +subsidies + taxes OBS 
+ benefits 
pensions  
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]  
 Austria 82.3 93.6 85.9 97.0 98.8  
 Belgium  95.2 89.7 94.7 85.2 88.0  
 Denmark 67.3 71.3 87.9 91.1 91.7  
 Finland 121.6 120.5 116.5 113.8 112.9  
 France 95.9 99.6 101.6 98.3 98.3  
 Germany 110.1 102.5 95.6 104.0 105.1  
 Greece 109.6 101.0 98.0 104.6 103.6  
 Ireland 145.3 143.2 118.9 125.7 123.5  
 Italy 96.7 94.6 96.6 96.2 96.0  
 Netherlands 80.9 79.0 76.5 79.2 84.9  
 Portugal 90.9 103.5 103.7 117.3 115.2  
 Spain 117.9 110.8 111.1 85.4 86.2  
 Sweden 42.5 58.6 68.8 48.8 52.8  
 UK 131.6 118.3 126.2 139.6 136.7  
 avge. EU14 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  
____________________________________________________________ 
- Note: in column [5] pensions are assumed  to grow at the same rate as average wages (g). 
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Table A.14: tax or subsidy wedge induced by 
various public interventions 
____________________________________________________________ 
  educationalsu
bsidies 
personal 
taxes 
social benefits all  
gov' t 
pensions  
  [2]-[1] [2]-[3] [3]-[4] [1]-[4] [5]-[4]  
 Austria 4.13% 1.39% 0.44% -2.30% 0.38% 
 Belgium  2.72% 0.03% 2.41% -0.28% 0.46% 
 Denmark 2.79% -1.29% 1.17% -2.91% 0.27% 
 Finland 4.12% 1.16% 2.17% -0.79% 0.19% 
 France 3.75% 0.41% 1.97% -1.38% 0.23% 
 Germany 3.00% 1.35% 0.84% -0.81% 0.34% 
 Greece 2.88% 0.94% 1.04% -0.89% 0.16% 
 Ireland 4.84% 3.42% 1.37% -0.06% 0.10% 
 Italy 3.15% 0.38% 1.63% -1.14% 0.21% 
 Netherlands 2.61% 0.75% 1.03% -0.84% 0.70% 
 Portugal 4.57% 0.62% 0.52% -3.43% 0.09% 
 Spain 3.33% 0.65% 4.10% 1.42% 0.27% 
 Sweden 3.27% -0.70% 2.90% -1.07% 0.47% 
 UK 3.12% -0.09% 0.91% -2.31% 0.07% 
 avge. EU14 3.49% 0.62% 1.65% -1.22% 0.24% 
____________________________________________________________ 
Table A.15: Net implicit subsidy or tax rate induced by 
various public interventions 
____________________________________________________________ 
  educationalsu
bsidies 
personal 
taxes 
social benefits all  
gov' t 
pensions  
  [2]-[1] [2]-[3] [3]-[4] [1]-[4] [5]-[4]  
 Austria 66.40% 22.30% 7.11% -36.99% 6.16% 
 Belgium  37.76% 0.45% 33.47% -3.85% 6.38% 
 Denmark 54.88% -25.39% 22.99% -57.27% 5.33% 
 Finland 44.82% 12.57% 23.61% -8.64% 2.04% 
 France 51.76% 5.61% 27.11% -19.04% 3.11% 
 Germany 36.02% 16.23% 10.10% -9.68% 4.11% 
 Greece 34.74% 11.39% 12.56% -10.80% 1.96% 
 Ireland 44.11% 31.12% 12.45% -0.54% 0.87% 
 Italy 43.09% 5.20% 22.31% -15.58% 2.82% 
 Netherlands 42.76% 12.20% 16.82% -13.74% 11.42% 
 Portugal 66.57% 9.06% 7.54% -49.97% 1.25% 
 Spain 37.39% 7.32% 45.97% 15.89% 3.03% 
 Sweden 101.88% -21.87% 90.26% -33.49% 14.75% 
 UK 31.42% -0.93% 9.11% -23.23% 0.70% 
 avge. EU14 46.20% 8.17% 21.89% -16.15% 3.11% 
____________________________________________________________ 
- Note: in column [5] pensions are assumed  to grow at the same rate as average wages (g). 
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6. Detailed results: fiscal returns 
Table A.16 gives our estimates of the fiscal rate of return to schooling under the different 
assumptions discussed in the text. 
 
 
 
A number of things should be noted about these estimates. The first is that the 
introduction of pension benefits does raise some problems for their calculation, for pensions 
represent a large negative cash flow at the “end of the project” and, as is well known, this can 
give rise to multiple solutions or to the absence of them in the calculation of internal rates 
of return. For two of the countries in the sample, indeed, the fiscal rate of return equation has 
no solution. This is illustrated for the case of Austria in Figure A.1, which shows the net 
present fiscal value of schooling as a function of the discount rate. In all other cases, the rate 
of return equation has two solutions, at least one of which is negative, as illustrated in 
Figure A.2 for the case of the average EU14 country. In these cases we report the larger of 
the two solutions. When it is positive, this figure is not misleading as the net present value 
of schooling will be positive for any interest rate between zero and the reported rate of return 
and negative thereafter, so this is indeed the highest positive interest rate at which the 
government can borrow to finance educational expenditure without increasing the present 
value of its current and future deficits. 
 
Table A.16: Fiscal rate of return on schooling 
___________________________________________________________ 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]  
  personal 
taxes 
+ consump. 
taxes 
+ employer 
s. sec. contr.
+ pensions 1
(ω = g) 
+ pensions 2 
(ω = 0) 
 
 Austria 0.68% 1.17% 2.11%    
 Belgium  3.03% 3.15% 3.91% 3.10% 3.20%  
 Denmark 0.82% 1.19% 1.18% -1.01% -0.53%  
 Finland 3.77% 4.10% 4.92% 4.37% 4.42%  
 France 1.52% 2.11% 3.66% 2.69% 2.81%  
 Germany 3.97% 4.13% 4.70% 3.93% 4.01%  
 Greece 1.79% 2.54% 3.70% 2.22% 2.44%  
 Ireland 5.34% 5.67% 6.17% 5.82% 5.85%  
 Italy 1.81% 2.21% 3.39% -2.31% 2.47%  
 Netherlands 2.25% 2.52% 2.82%    
 Portugal 0.09% 1.18% 2.42% 1.04% 1.20%  
 Spain 2.98% 3.37% 4.74% 3.92% 4.01%  
 Sweden -1.42% -1.25% -0.52% -2.58% -2.11%  
 UK 3.19% 3.80% 4.53% 3.43% 3.55%  
 avge. EU14 2.35% 2.74% 3.58% 2.48% 2.62%  
___________________________________________________________ 
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Finally, it should be kept in mind that internal rates of return and net present 
values do not necessarily move in the same direction. Sweden is a clear example of this. 
Comparing table A.16 with Table 11 in the text, we see that the introduction of consumption 
taxes and employer social security contributions increases the fiscal rate of return but 
reduces the net present fiscal value obtained with a 3% real discount rate. Since taking into 
account such taxes when calculating the returns to a marginal increase in schooling raises tax 
receipts in the future but also increases the opportunity cost of schooling in terms of foregone 
tax revenues from currently active workers, their effect on net present values will depend on 
the discount rate and, as illustrated in Figure A.3, the resulting changes in the internal rate of 
return and on the net present fiscal value at a given discount rate may be of opposite signs. 
 
Figure A.2: Net present fiscal value of a year of schooling as a function of the discount rate, 
average EU14 country ( ω= 0) 
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Figure A.1: Net present fiscal value of a year of schooling as a function of the discount rate, 
Austria ( ω= 0) 
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Figure A.3: Net present fiscal value of a year of schooling as a function of the discount rate, 
under different scenarios, Sweden 
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APPENDIX 2: DETAILED CALCULATIONS 
1. The private return to schooling 
The lifetime net income function given in the text can be written 
 
(1) V(X) = 
 
Aoe
νH o / 2 Fs (t )
0
X∫ e−(R+ν )t dt  -  AoµseνHo / 2 f (So) e−(R+ν) t dt0X∫  
+ 
 
Ao F(X )
X
U∫ e−Rt dt +  Aoe(g +ν −ω )UFp X( ) e−(R+ g+ν −ω )tUZ∫ dt  
where So ≡ S(Xo)  and 
 
(2) R ≡ r - g - ν 
 
Differentiating (1) with respect to X, we have 
  
V' (X) = AoeνHo /2Fs(X)e−(R+ν)X −AoeνHo /2µs f(So)e−(R +ν )X
             +Ao F' (X)
X
U∫ e−Rtdt −F(X)e−RX⎧ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ 
⎫ ⎬ ⎪ ⎭ +Aoe
(g +ν−ω)U Fp' X( ) e−(R+g+ν−ω )t
U
Z∫ dt⎧ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ 
⎫ ⎬ ⎪ ⎭ 
 
or 
 
  
V' (X )
Ao
=e−(R+ν )X eνHo / 2 Fs (X ) −µs f (So)[ ]−F(X )e−RX
             +F' (X )
e−RX −e−RU
R
+e(g +ν −ω )UFp' X( ) e
−(R +g +ν −ω )U −e−(R +g +ν −ω )Z
R + g +ν −ω
 
 
 
  
V' (X )
Ao
= e−(R+ν )X eνHo / 2 Fs (X ) − µs f (So)[ ]− F(X )e−RX
             +F' (X )e−RX 1− e
−R(U − X )
R
+e(g +ν −ω )U Fp' X( )e−(R +g +ν −ω )U 1− e
−(R+ g+ν −ω )( Z −U )
R + g + ν −ω
 
 
Ιn this expression, notice that 
 
U - X = H  
 
and 
 
  e(g+ν −ω )Ue−(R+ g+ν −ω )U = e−RU = e−R( X +H )  
 
Hence, 
 
  
V' (X )
Ao
= e−(R+ν )X eνHo / 2 Fs (X ) − µs f (So)[ ]− F(X )e−RX
             +F' (X )e−RX
1− e−RH
R
+Fp' X( )e−RX e−RH 1− e
−(R+ g+ν −ω )(Z −U )
R + g + ν − ω
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 72 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0509 
which can be written 
 
  
V' (X )
Ao
= e−(R+ν )X eνHo / 2 Fs (X ) − µs f (So)[ ]− F(X )e−RX
             +e−RX 1 − e
−RH
R
F' ( X ) + Fp' X( )e−RH R
1 − e−RH
1− e−(R+ g+ν −ω )(Z −U )
R + g + ν − ω
⎧ 
⎨ ⎪ 
⎩ ⎪ 
⎫ 
⎬ ⎪ 
⎭ ⎪ 
 
or 
 
  
(3)
V' ( X)
Aoe
−RX = e−νXeνH o / 2 Fs( X) − µs f (So)[ ]− F( X)
             +
1− e−RH
R
F' (X ) + Fp' X( ) RR + g + ν −ω
1 − e−(R +g +ν −ω )( Z −U )
eRH − 1
⎧ 
⎨ ⎪ 
⎩ ⎪ 
⎫ 
⎬ ⎪ 
⎭ ⎪ 
 
 
It will be useful to define 
 
(4)
  
γ ( R) ≡ R
R + g + ν −ω
1 − e−(R +g +ν −ω )( Z −U )
eRH − 1  
 
and to write equation (3) in the form 
  
V' (X )
Aoe
−RX = e−νX eνH o / 2 Fs (X ) − µs f (So )[ ]− F(X ) + 1 − e
−RH
R
F' (X ) + γ (R)Fp' X( ){ } 
 
 
Evaluating this expression at Xo and setting it equal to zero, 
  
1− e−RH
R
F' (Xo ) + γ ( R)Fp' Xo( ){ }= F(Xo ) − e−νX eνH o / 2 Fs (Xo ) − µs f (So )[ ] 
 
we arrive at 
(5)
  
R
1− e−RH =
F' ( Xo) + γ ( R)Fp' Xo( )
F(Xo ) − Fs( Xo)e−νXeνHo / 2 + µs f (So )e−νXeνH o / 2
 
 
As discussed in the text, the functions F(), Fs() and Fp() that determine, respectively, 
the expected net-of-tax earnings of an adult active worker, a part-time student worker and a 
pensioner, are defined by 
 
(6)   Fs (x) =   ps S(x )[ ] (1 − φ) f S(x)[ ]− T (1 − φ) f S(x)[ ]( ){ } 
 
(7) 
  
Fp X( ) = κe−νX f S( X)( )− T κe−νX f S( X )( )[ ] 
 
(8)   F( X) =   p S( X)[ ]Fe(X ) + 1− p S(X )[ ]( )Fu (X )  
 
where 
 
(9)   Fe(X ) =   e
−ν X f S ( X )[ ] − T e −ν X f S ( X )[ ]( )    and 
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(10)   Fu (X ) =   B e
−νX f S( X )[ ]( )− T B e −νX f S( X )[ ]( )⎡ ⎣ ⎢ ⎤ ⎦ ⎥  
give, respectively, the net earnings of an employed and an unemployed adult worker per 
efficiency unit of labour. 
To rewrite equation 5) in a more convenient form, we proceed as follows. First, 
we define the average tax rates for the representative employed and unemployed 
adult workers, student part-time workers and pensioners (τe, τu, τs and τp) and the gross 
replacement ratio, b, (that is, the ratio between gross earnings in employment and gross 
earnings out of employment) by 
(11) 
  
τe ≡
T e−νXo f (So )( )
e−νXo f (So )
,  
  
τu ≡
T B e−νXo f (So )( )⎛ ⎝ ⎜ ⎞ ⎠ ⎟ 
B e−νXo f (So )( ) ,   τs ≡ T (1 − φ) f (So )( )(1− φ )f (So) ,  
  
τp ≡
T κe−νXo f (So )( )
κe−νXo f (So )
  and  
 
b≡
B e−νX o f (So )( )
e−νXo f (So )
 
 
Using these expressions, we have 
 
(12)   Fe(Xo ) =  
  
e−νXo f (So) − T e−νX o f (So)( )⎡ ⎣ ⎢ ⎤ ⎦ ⎥ = 1− T e−νXo f (So )( )e−νX o f (So)
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ 
e−νXo f (So) = (1− τe )e−νX o f (So)  
 
and, by the same procedure 
 
(13)   Fu (X o) =   (1 −τu )be−νX o f (So)  
 
(14)  Fp (Xo ) =   (1 −τ p )κe
−νXo f (So )  
 
(15)   Fs (Xo ) =   ηp( 1− φ)( 1− τ s ) f (So )  
 
where 
 
(16)    p ≡ p(So )  
 
Hence, F(Xo) can be written 
  
(17) F(Xo ) = pFe (Xo ) + 1 − p( )Fu (Xo ) = p( 1− τe ) + 1 − p( )(1− τu )b[ ]e−νXo f (So )
                   =p(1- τ )e−νXo f (So )
 
 
where 
(18) 
  
(1- τ ) ≡ (1 −τ e ) + 1 − pp (1 −τu )b  ⇒   τ = τ e −
1− p
p
(1− τu )b  
 
Next, we compute the following derivatives: 
 
(19)   Fe' (Xo ) = 1 − T'e( )e−νXo f ' (So )S' (Xo ) − νf (So )[ ] 
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(20)   Fp' (Xo ) = 1− T' p( )κe−νXo f ' (So )S' (Xo ) − νf (So )[ ] 
 
(21)   F'u ( Xo) = 1 − T'u( )B' e−νXo f ' (So )S' ( Xo) −νf (So)[ ] 
 
where 
(22) 
  
T ' e ≡ T ' e − νX o f ( S o )( ),  
  
T'u ≡ T' B e−νX o f (So)( )⎛ ⎝ ⎜ ⎞ ⎠ ⎟  and   T ' p ≡ T ' κe − νX o f ( S o )( ) 
 
are the marginal tax rates applicable to the reference employed and unemployed worker and 
to the representative pensioner and 
(23) 
  
B' ≡ B' e − νX o f ( S o )( ) 
 
the marginal unemployment benefit rate for the average worker. Differentiating F(), we have: 
 
(24) 
  F' (Xo )  =  p' (So )S' ( Xo)Fe(Xo ) + p(So )Fe' (Xo ) − p' (So)S' (Xo )Fu (Xo ) + 1 − p(So )( )Fu ' (Xo )  
=  p' S' Fe( Xo) − Fu ( Xo )[ ]+ pFe' ( Xo) + 1− p( )Fu' ( Xo)  
  
= p' S' ( 1− τe ) − ( 1− τu )b[ ]e−νXo f (So )
      + p 1 − T'e( )+ 1− p( )B' 1− T'u( )[ ]e−νXo f ' (So)S' (Xo ) −νf (So )[ ] 
  = p' S' ∆e−νXo f (So ) + p 1− T'( )e−νX o f ' (So )S' (Xo ) − νf (So )[ ] 
 
where we have defined 
 
(25) 
  
1− T' ≡ 1− T'e( )+ 1 − pp 1 − T'u( )B'   ⇒  T' ≡ T'e − 1− pp 1− T'u( )B'    and 
 
(26)   ∆ ≡ (1− τe ) − (1− τu )b  
 
Inserting the expressions we have just derived into the right-hand side of equation (5) 
and dividing through by  e
−νX f (So ) , we have 
 
(27) 
  
R' = p 1− T'( ) θS' ( Xo ) − ν[ ]+ ∆p' S' ( Xo ) + γ( R) 1− T' p( )κ θS' (Xo ) − ν[ ]
p(1- τ ) −ηp(1 − φ)( 1− τ s )eνH o / 2[ ]+ µseνH o / 2   
where 
(28)
  
θ ≡ f' (So )
f (So )
 
 
is the Mincerian returns to schooling parameter. 
 
This is equation (35) in the text. For some purposes it will be more convenient to 
divide through by F(Xo) =   p(1- τ )e-νX f (So ) , so that all terms are expressed as fractions of 
the expected starting earnings of an active adult worker. We have then: 
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(29) R' =
1 − T'
1- τ θS' −ν( )+
∆
1- τ εS' +γ( R)
1− T'p
p(1- τ ) κ θS' −ν( )
1 −η(1− φ ) 1− τ s
1- τ e
νH o / 2⎡ ⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ +
µs
p(1- τ ) e
νHo / 2
           =
(1 − π)θ' +( 1− ρ)ε' +γ ( R) 1 − T' p
p(1- τ ) κθ'
1 −η(1− φ ) 1− τ s
1- τ e
νH o / 2⎡ ⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ +
µs
p(1- τ ) e
νH o / 2
 
where 
(30)  
  
ε ≡ p' (So )
p(So )
 
 
is the semielasticity of the probability of employment function and we have defined 
(31)   θ' ≡ θS' (Xo ) − ν     and     ε' ≡ εS' ( Xo ) 
 
The terms π and ρ are defined by 
(32)  
  
1− π ≡ 1 − T'
1− τ     ⇒        π = 1 −
1 − T'
1− τ =
T' −τ
1 −τ  
 
and27 
(33)  
  
ρ ≡ (1 −τu )b
p(1- τ )  
 
Notice that ρ is a modified average net replacement ratio (calculated as a fraction of the 
expected net earnings of an active worker rather than as a fraction of net income 
in employment), and that π can be interpreted as a measure of progressivity. The ratio 
  
1− T'
1 −τ   is the elasticity of the expected net earnings of an adult active worker with respect 
to gross earnings in employment. 
 
A special case 
The above derivation assumes that unemployment benefits are set as a function of 
gross income in employment. This is so in most countries, but there are two 
exceptions. Germany and Austria set benefits as a fixed fraction (β) of net-of-tax income 
in employment and exempt them from tax. In this case, the calculations above have to be 
adjusted as follows. 
 
                                                                          
27. Notice that 
  
(1- τ ) ≡ (1 −τ e ) + 1 − pp (1 −τu )b=( 1− τe ) − ( 1− τu )b +
( 1− τu )b
p
= ∆ + (1− τu )b
p
 
Hence, 
  
∆ = (1- τ ) − (1− τu )b
p
 
and 
  
∆
1- τ =
(1- τ ) − (1− τu )b
p
1- τ = 1 −
(1 −τu )b
p(1- τ ) ≡ 1− ρ   
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First, the net income of an unemployed worker (per efficiency unit of labour) will be 
given by 
(10')   Fu (X ) = βFe (X )  
 
Hence,  
(8')   F( X) =   p(S)Fe (X ) + 1 − p(S)( )Fu ( X ) =  pFe(X ) + 1 − p( )βFe( X ) = p + 1− p( )β[ ]Fe( X)  
 
from where 
(17')   F( Xo) =   p + 1− p( )β[ ](1 −τ e )e−νX f (So )  
 
(24)   F' (Xo )   = p' S' ∆e−νX f (So) + p 1 − T'( )e−νX f ' (So )S' (Xo ) −νf (So)[ ] 
=  p' S' 1− β( )( 1− τe ) f (So )e−νX + p + 1 − p( )β[ ]1 − T'e( )e−νX f ' (So)S' −νf (So )( ) 
 
If we define 
 
(25')
  
1− T' ≡ 1 + 1− p
p
β⎡ ⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 1− T'e( )  , 
(18') 
  
(1- τ ) ≡ 1+ 1 − p
p
β⎡ ⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ ( 1− τe )     and 
(26')   ∆ ≡ (1− τe )( 1− β)  
 
we can write F and F' in the same form as in the previous section 
 
(17)   F( Xo) =   p( 1− τ ) f (So)e−νX  
(24)   F' (Xo ) =   = p' S' ∆e−νX f (So) + p 1 − T'( )e−νX f ' (So )S' (Xo ) −νf (So)[ ] 
 
and equations (27) and (29) continue to hold as written. Notice, however, that in this case ρ is 
defined by 
 
  
1− ρ ≡ ∆
1- τ =
(1− τe )( 1− β)
1 + 1− p
p
β⎡ ⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ (1 −τ e)
= 1− β
1 − β + β
p
 
from where 
(33') 
  
ρ = 1− 1− β
1− β + β
p
=
β
p
1 − β + β
p
= β
p( 1− β) + β =
β
p + ( 1− p)β  
 
Decomposition of the progressivity ratio 
We can relate π to πu and πe as follows: 
 
  
1− π ≡ p(1 − T' )
p( 1− τ ) =
p(1 − T'e ) + (1− p)( 1− T'u )B'
p(1 −τ ) =
p( 1− τe ) ( 1− T'e )(1 −τ e) + (1 − p)(1 −τu )b
(1 − T'u )B'
( 1− τu )b
p(1 −τ )  
  
= p( 1− τe )
p( 1− τ ) ( 1− πe ) +
(1 − p)( 1 −τu )b
p(1− τ ) (1 − πu )
  = 1− ( 1− p)ρ[ ](1 − πe ) + (1 − p)ρ( 1− πu )  
 
or 
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  (1 − π ) = (1 − πe ) − (1 − p)ρ (1 − πe ) − (1 − πu )[ ]= (1 − πe) − (1 − p)ρ πu − πe( ) 
  π = 1 − (1− πe ) + (1 − p)ρ πu − πe( ) 
  π = πe + ( 1− p)ρ πu − πe( ). 
 
Finally, notice that in the cases of Austria and Germany we will have πu = πe since net 
benefits are set as a fixed fraction of after-tax income in employment. 
 
2. The fiscal returns to schooling 
We want to use the same procedure developed above to quantify the impact of schooling on 
government expenditures and revenues. Proceeding as above, the net present value of 
government net revenues is given by 
(34) Vg(X) = 
 
Aoe
νH o / 2 Gs(t )
0
X∫ e−(R+ν) tdt  +  Ao G(X )XU∫ e−Rt dt  
 - 
 
Aoe
νH o / 2µg f (So ) e−(R +ν )t
0
X∫ dt +  Aoe(g +ν −ω )Uq S(X )[ ]Gp (X ) e−(R+ g+ν −ω ) tUZ∫ dt  
where R ≡ r -g - ν , r is the discount rate and µg the cost of education born by the 
government as a fraction of the average worker's wage. 
Differentiating Vg(),º 
 
  
Vg' (X ) = AoeνH o / 2Gs ( X)e−(R +ν )X − AoeνH o / 2µg f (So)e−(R+ν )X
             +Ao G' (X )
X
U∫ e−Rt dt − G(X )e−RX⎧ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ ⎫ ⎬ ⎪ ⎭ + Aoe(g +ν −ω )U q' S' Gp X( ) + qGp' X( )[ ] e−(R+ g+ν −ω )tUZ∫ dt⎧ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ ⎫ ⎬ ⎪ ⎭ 
 
  
            = AoeνH o / 2Gs (X )e−(R +ν )X − AoeνH o / 2µg f (So)e−(R+ν)X
             +Aoe
−RX G' (X ) 1− e
−RH
R
− G(X )
⎧ 
⎨ ⎪ 
⎩ ⎪ 
⎫ 
⎬ ⎪ 
⎭ ⎪ 
+Aoe
−R(X + H ) q' S' Gp X( )+ qGp' X( )[ ]1 − e −(R +g +ν −ω )( Z −U )R + g + ν −ω
 
and proceeding as in the previous section, it is easy to show that 
 
(35) 
  
R
1− e−RH =
G' (Xo ) + γ ( R) q' S' (Xo )Gp (Xo ) + qGp' (Xo )[ ]
G( Xo) − Gs (Xo )e−νXeνH o / 2 + µg f (So )e−νX eνH o / 2
 
 
where 
(36)
  
γ ( R) = 1 − e
−(R +g +ν −ω )( Z −U )
eRH − 1
R
R + g + ν −ω  
 
  
(37) Gs (X ) = qs S(X )[ ]ps S( X)[ ]
                 * T ( 1− φ) f S(X )( )( )+ E ( 1− φ) f S(X )( )( )+ τ cC (1 − φ) f S(X )( ) − T (1− φ ) f S( X)( )( )[ ]{ }
 
(38) 
  
Gp X( )≡ −κe−νX f S(X )( ) + T κe−νX f S( X )( )[ ]+ τ cC κe−νX f S(X )( ) − T κe−νX f S(X )( )[ ]⎡ ⎣ ⎢ ⎤ ⎦ ⎥  
 
(39)   G(X ) = q S(X )[ ] p S( X )[ ]Ge(X ) + 1− p S(X )[ ]( )Gu (X ){ } 
 
with 
(40) 
  
Ge(X ) = T e−νX f S(X )[ ]( )+ τ cC e−νX f S(X )[ ]− T e−νX f S( X)[ ]( )⎡ ⎣ ⎢ ⎤ ⎦ ⎥ + E e−νX f S( X )[ ]( ) 
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(41)
  
Gu ( X) = −B e−νX f S(X )[ ]( )+ T B e−νX f S(X )[ ]( )⎛ ⎝ ⎜ ⎞ ⎠ ⎟ + τ cC B e−νX f S(X )[ ]( )− T B e−νX f S(X )[ ]( )⎛ ⎝ ⎜ ⎞ ⎠ ⎟ ⎛ ⎝ ⎜ ⎞ ⎠ ⎟ 
 
The functions q(S) and qs(S) = ηqq(S) describe the probabilities that an adult worker 
and a student respectively will be active as a function of their attainment level. Hence, 
G(S) denotes the expected net tax revenue (net of unemployment benefits) for an adult 
worker of attainment S, Gp() that generated by a pensioner, and Gs(s) by a student of 
attainment s –with all three variables expressed in amounts per efficiency unit of labour. 
 
We will now calculate the different terms that appear in equation (35). To proceed, 
we will define the average and marginal propensities to consume out of after-tax income 
(c and C') of students, pensioners and adult employed and unemployed workers, 
(42)  
  
cs ≡ C ( 1− τs )(1 − φ) f (So )[ ](1 −τ s )( 1− φ ) f (So)     ce ≡
C (1 −τe )e−νX f (So)[ ]
( 1− τe )e−νX f (So )
   
  
cu ≡
C ( 1− τu )be−νX f (So)[ ]
(1 −τu )be−νX f (So )
 
 
(43)  
  
C'e ≡ C' ( 1− τe )e−νX f (So )[ ]     C'u ≡ C' (1 −τu )be−νX f (So )[ ]   
  
C'p ≡ C' ( 1− τ p )κe−νX f (So )[ ] 
 
and the average and marginal rates of employer's social security contributions for employed 
adult and student workers 
 
(44) 
  
es ≡ E ( 1− φ) f (So )[ ](1 − φ) f (So )      ee ≡
E e−νX f (So)[ ]
e−νX f (So)
   and  
 
E'e ≡ E' e−νX f (So )( ) 
 
Using this notation, and the average and marginal tax rates defined in the previous 
section, we have: 
 
 
(45)  Gs (Xo ) = qs ps τ s + es + τccs (1 −τ s ){ }( 1− φ) f (So ) ≡ qηqpsTs (1 − φ) f (So ) 
 
(46)  Gp Xo( )= −(1 −τ p )(1 −τ ccp )κe−νX f (So ) ≡ Tpe−νX f (So )  
 
(47)  Ge(Xo ) = τ e + τ cce(1 −τ e ) + ee[ ]e−νX f (So ) ≡ Tee−νX f (So )  
 
(48)  Gu (So) = −(1− τccu )(1 −τu )be−νX f (So) ≡ Tue−νX f (So )  
 
and therefore 
 
(49)  G(Xo ) = q pGe (Xo ) + 1 − p( )Gu (Xo ){ }= q pTe + 1 − p( )Tu{ }e−νX f (So) ≡ qTae−νX f (So )  
 
where we have defined the following average “total tax rates”, 
 
(50)   Ts ≡ τ s + es + τ ccs( 1− τ s )  
  Tp ≡ −(1− τ p )( 1− τccp )κ  
  Te ≡ τ e + τ cce(1 −τ e ) + ee  
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  Tu ≡ −(1 −τ ccu )( 1− τu )b  
  Ta ≡ pTe + 1 − p( )Tu  
 
Next, we calculate the derivatives of these functions with respect to X. We have: 
(51) 
 
  Gp' Xo( )= −(1− τcC'p )(1 − Tp' )κe−νX f ' (So )S' ( Xo) −νf (So)[ ]≡ ∆' p e−νX f ' (So)S' (Xo ) − νf (So )[ ]
(52) 
  G'e ( Xo) = T'e +τ cC'e ( 1− T'e ) + E'e[ ]e−νX f' (So )S' (Xo ) − νf (So )[ ]≡ ∆' e e−νX f ' (So )S' (Xo ) −νf (So )[ ]
(53) 
  G'u (Xo ) = − 1- τ cC'u( )1− T'u( )B' e−νX f ' (So)S' (Xo ) − νf (So )[ ]≡ ∆' u e−νX f ' (So)S' (Xo ) − νf (So )[ ]
where we have defined 
(54)   ∆' p ≡ −(1− τcC'p )(1 − Tp' )κ  
(55)   ∆' e ≡ T'e +τcC'e (1 − T'e ) + E'e  
(56)   ∆' u ≡ − 1- τ cC'u( )1− T'u( )B'  
 
Finally, 
 
 
where we have defined 
 
(58)   ∆' a ≡ p∆' e + 1− p( )∆' u         
 
Notice that Tp, Tu, ∆'p and ∆'u are negative. 
 
Substituting these expressions into the rate of return formula and dividing through by 
qf(So)e-νX 
  
(57) G' (Xo ) = q' S' pGe(Xo ) + 1 − p( )Gu (Xo )[ ]+q p' S' Ge (Xo ) + pG'e (Xo ) − p' S' Gu ( Xo ) + 1− p( )G'u (Xo )[ ]
          = q' S' pTe + 1 − p( )Tu[ ]e-νX f(So ) +q Ge(Xo ) − Gu (Xo )[ ]p' S' +q pG'e (Xo ) + 1 − p( )G'u (Xo )[ ]
          = q' S' Tae
-νX f(So ) +q Te − Tu( )e-νX f(So)p' S' +q p∆' e + 1 − p( )∆' u{ }e−νX f ' (So )S' (Xo ) − νf (So )[ ]
          ≡ q' S' Tae-νX f(So ) + q Te − Tu( )e-νX f(So)p' S' + q∆' a e−νX f ' (So )S' (Xo ) − νf (So )[ ]       
 
  
R
1− e−RH
= G' (Xo ) + γ ( R) q' S' (Xo )Gp (Xo ) + qGp' (Xo )[ ]
G( Xo) − Gs (Xo )e−νXeνH o / 2 + µg f (So )e−νX eνH o / 2
= q' S' Tae
-νX f(So ) + q Te − Tu( )e-νX f(So)p' S' + q∆' a e−νX f ' (So )S' (Xo ) − νf (So )[ ] 
qTae
−νX f (So ) − qηq psTs (1− φ )f (So)e−νXeνHo / 2 + µg f (So )e−νXeνH o / 2
+γ ( R) q' S' (Xo )Tpe
−νX f (So ) + q∆' p e−νX f ' (So)S' (Xo ) −νf (So )[ ]
qTae
−νX f (So ) − qηqpsTs (1 − φ) f (So )e−νXeνH o / 2 + µg f (So )e−νX eνH o / 2
 
 
  
= q' S' Ta + q Te − Tu( )p' S' +q∆' a θS' ( Xo) −ν[ ] 
qTa − qηqpsTs (1 − φ)eνH o / 2 + µgeνH o / 2
+ γ( R) q' S' (Xo )Tp + q∆' p θS' (Xo ) − ν[ ]
qTa − qηqpsTs (1 − φ)eνH o / 2 + µgeνH o / 2
 
 
  
=
q'
q
S' Ta + Te − Tu( )p' S' +∆' a θ ' +γ ( R) q'q S' ( Xo)Tp + ∆' p θ'
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
Ta −ηq psTs( 1− φ)eνH o / 2 +
µg
q
eνHo / 2
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or 
  
(59) 
R
1− e−RH =
q'
q
S' Ta + Te − Tu( )p' S' +∆' a θ' +γ ( R) q'q S' (Xo )Tp + ∆' p θ'
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ 
Ta −ηq psTs (1 − φ)eνH o / 2 +
µg
q
eνHo / 2
≡ N 1 + γ (R)N 2
D
 
Alternatively, we can fix the discount rate, r, and calculate the present value of the 
net benefits of schooling. It will be convenient to discount this quantity to the period students 
leave school (at time X) and to relate it to the wage of the average worker at that time, which 
is given by 
 
  Wo(X ) = W (t , Xo , Ho / 2) = AoegX f So( )eνH o / 2  
 
From above, we have 
 
  
Vg' (X ) = AoeνH o / 2Gs ( X)e−(R +ν )X − AoeνH o / 2µg f (So)e−(R+ν )X - Aoe−RX G(X )
             +Aoe
−RX G' (X ) 1− e
−RH
R
+ Aoe
−R( X +H ) q' S' Gp X( )+ qGp' X( )[ ]1− e −(R+ g+ν −ω )( Z −U )R + g + ν −ω
 
which can be written (recall that R ≡ r -g - ν), 
 
 
Taking each of the terms inside the bracket at a time, we have 
 
(61) 
Gs (X )
f So( ) −
eνXG(X )
f So( )eνHo / 2 − µg = qηqps( 1− φ)Ts − qTae
−νHo / 2 − µg = −qe−νH o / 2D  
 
  
(62) 
eνX G' (X )
f So( )eνH o / 2 = e
νX q' S' Tae-νX f(So ) + q Te − Tu( )e-νX f(So )p' S' +q∆'a e−νX f ' (So )S' ( Xo) −νf (So)[ ] 
f So( )eνH o / 2
                   = q'
q
S' Ta + Te − Tu( )p' S' +∆'a θ'⎡ ⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ qe
−νH o / 2 = qe−νH o / 2N 1
 
 
  
(60) Vg' (X )e
rX
=
eνH o / 2Gs (X )e−(r− g)X - e−(r− g−ν )XG(X )
egX f So( )eνH o / 2 −
µge−(r− g)X
egX
+e−(r −g −ν )X G' (X )
egX f So( )eνH o / 2
1 − e−(r −g −ν )H
r − g − ν +e
−(r− g−ν )(X + H ) q' S' Gp X( ) + qGp' X( )
egX f So( )eνH o / 2
1− e −(r−ω )( Z −U )
r −ω
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ 
⎭ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ 
erX Aoe
gX f So( )eνH o / 2
  
=
Gs (X )
f So( ) −
eνXG(X )
f So( )eνH o / 2 − µg +
eνX G' (X )
f So( )eνH o / 2
1− e−(r− g−ν)H
r − g −ν
+e−(r −g −ν )HeνX
q' S' Gp X( )+ qGp' X( )
f So( )eνH o / 2
1 − e −(r −ω )(Z −U )
r − ω
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ 
⎪ ⎪ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ 
⎭ 
⎪ 
⎪ ⎪ 
Aoe
gX f So( )eνH o / 2
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Using these expressions, we have the following expression for the marginal NPV of 
schooling: 
(64) 
  
Vg' (X )e
rX = −D + N1 1 − e
−(r −g −ν )H
r − g − ν +N 2e
−(r− g−ν )H 1− e −(r−ω )( Z −U )
r −ω
⎧ 
⎨ ⎪ 
⎩ ⎪ 
⎫ 
⎬ ⎪ 
⎭ ⎪ 
qe−νHo / 2Wo  
 
A special case 
When unemployment benefits are linked to net-of-tax income in employment and are not 
taxed the above has to be modified as follows. We have then 
 
(65)   Gu (S) = −β f (S) − T f (S)( )[ ]+ τcC β f (S) − T f (S)( )( )[ ] 
with 
 
 
and 
 
 
With this new definitions of Tu and ∆'u, the equation derived above for the fiscal rate 
of return continues to hold as written, and so does the net present fiscal value formula. 
  
(63) e−(r− g−ν )HeνX
q' S' Gp X( )+ qGp' X( )
f So( )eνHo / 2 = e
−(r −g −ν )HeνX
q' S' Tpe
−νX f (So) + q∆' p e−νX f' (So )S' (Xo ) − νf (So )[ ]
f So( )eνH o / 2
         = e−(r −g −ν )H q'
q
S' Tp + ∆' p θ '
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ qe
−νH o / 2 = N 2e−(r− g−ν )Hqe−νHo / 2
  
(66) Gu (So ) = −β f (So ) − T f (So)( )[ ]+ τcC β f (So) − T f (So )( )( )[ ]
                   = −β(1 −τ e )f (So ) + τccu β(1 −τ e )f (So) = −(1− τccu )β(1 −τ e) f (So )
                   ≡ Tu f (So )
  
(67) Gu ' (So ) = −β f ' (So) − T' f (So)( )f ' (So )[ ]+ τcC' ()β f ' (So ) − T' f (So )( )f ' (So )[ ]
                    = −β 1− Te'( )f ' (So ) + τ cCu ' β 1 − Te'( )f' (So )
                    = − 1 −τ cCu'( )β 1 − Te'( )f ' (So) ≡ ∆' u f' (So )
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